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The rise of consumerism and the increasing availability of information through the
Internet have increased patients’ demand for care that is more in line with their
preferences. Because of this trend the expectation that hospitals act according to each
individual patient’s preferences is becoming even more prominent. Hospitals could
respond by implementing flexible health care policies that offer patients more choice. 
In this dissertation we explore two types of flexible health care policies from the
consumer perspective: priority access pricing and customized care. We do this by (1)
investigating how consumers evaluate price-based priority access allocation policies (i.e.,
allocation policies in which patients are offered the option to pay extra for faster health
care access), and by (2) demonstrating how the collective costs and benefits of customized
health care policies (i.e., policies that offer individuals the possibility to “create” their own
health care program) can be used to evaluate customized care. Throughout, special
attention is given to the role of collective health outcomes.
Besides our scientific conclusions, our findings are also relevant for hospitals and policy
makers that consider implementing new allocation policies. They can be used to provide
assistance in future health care decision making.
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
People are unique and have their own specific preferences. This heterogeneity in taste is 
also prominent in health care. Consider, for instance, the variation in preferences between 
individuals with regard to treatment programs. One treatment certainly does not fit all 
patients (Morey, Thacher, & Craighead, 2007). The rise of consumerism and the available 
information through the Internet raised patients’ expectations about care and increased 
patients’ demand for care according to their preferences even more (Frank & Zeckhauser, 
2007). Hospitals took advantage of this by listening to the patients and using their 
suggestions to improve medical decision making. In this way a more patient-centered 
health care approach arose (Bergeson & Dean, 2006). In short, there is a growing 
recognition that preference heterogeneity should be taken into account in future health care 
policies. This can be accomplished by offering patients care that is more flexible           
(i.e., offers more possibilities) and therefore better serves their needs. 
 Flexibility comes in many different kinds. On the one hand one can seek more 
flexibility in the pricing aspect of health care allocation. Due to financial considerations 
like the huge pressure on public budgets and increased competition market-based solutions 
to problems in health care are getting more and more attention (Cutler, 2002; Rice, 1997). 
Some people might be willing to pay an extra amount of money to receive earlier health 
care access. If this is the case hospitals could offer patients the option to either choose for 
standard access or to pay extra and receive priority access. Although such a policy violates 
the basic uniform treatment of all principle, a well-accepted principle in the Netherlands 
(Brouwer & Schut, 1999; Den Exter, 2010), the additional revenues from such a policy and 
the additional flexibility offered can be beneficial for both hospitals and patients. On the 
other hand, it is possible to offer patients freedom in creating their own health care 
programs given the available attributes they can choose from. This seems an interesting 
strategy, particularly because of the fact that patients often do not only know exactly what 
they want, but also how and when they want it. Flexible health care policies are key in this 
thesis and relates the chapters two, three, and four (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Thesis structure 
 
 
The first part of this thesis is about flexible health care policies in which hospitals 
introduce a market (i.e., price) mechanism for health care allocation by offering patients 
the option to pay more for faster health care treatment/access (i.e., price-based priority 
access allocation). The central goal in this part is to investigate what the role of individual 
and especially collective health outcomes is in the consumer evaluation process of such    
price-based allocation policies. Chapters two and three address this question in two 
different ways by focusing on, respectively, the moderating role of health consequence and 
supply flexibility (chapter two), and psychological distance (chapter three). The second 
PART II PART I 
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part of this thesis (chapter four) discusses a flexible health care policy in which patients 
have the option to create their own health care programs (i.e., customized care). The 
central goal in part two is to illustrate a method of how to organize and use the collective 
costs and benefits of such health care programs to evaluate customized care (Figure 1). 
1.1 Priority Access Pricing 
It is well known that there are not enough resources available to fulfill all consumers’ 
needs and wants in health care management. Therefore choices have to be made about how 
to allocate the resources at hand. For this purpose, governments and policy makers have 
utilized many different types of allocation policies ranging from non-price-based policies 
(e.g., expert-based decisions and waiting lists) to price-based policies (e.g., market-based 
priority access prices and auctions), to combinations of these (Evans, Vossler, & Flores, 
2009). In recent years these price-based policies received a lot of criticism because they 
violate the “uniform treatment of all” principle, which is a well-accepted principle in the 
Netherlands (Brouwer & Schut, 1999; Den Exter, 2010). Despite this criticism it is 
unknown how consumers exactly evaluate such allocation policies that allow differences in 
treatment between patients. In particular, the role of collective outcomes in consumers’ 
allocation policy evaluations is relatively unexplored. 
 
1.1.1 Collective health outcomes 
There is considerable evidence that besides their self-interest (Agerström & Björklund, 
2009a/b) consumers care about the interests of others in the society. This is based on the 
fact that people show fair, reciprocal, and altruistic behavior (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; 
Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). A nice quote that strengthens the importance of collective interests 
even more is the one by Culyer (1976, p.89): “Individuals are affected by others’ health 
status for the simple reason that most of them care”.  
The literature on health care discusses two types of collective interests, which we 
expect to play a decisive role in consumer evaluations of allocation policies, referred to in 
this dissertation as total collective health outcome and distributional collective health 
outcome. The total collective health outcome (i.e., the efficiency of the allocation policy) 
expresses the expected total gain in health that results from an allocation policy, and the 
distributional collective health outcome (i.e., the equity of the allocation policy) expresses 
how equally the health outcome resulting from the allocation policy is distributed among 
individuals (Wagstaff, 1991). Interestingly, individuals are often willing to sacrifice some 
Chapter 1 
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part of the total collective health outcome in return for a better distributional collective 
health outcome (e.g., Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2000). This strengthens our 
argument that evaluations of both total and distributional health outcomes play a 
substantial role when consumers evaluate allocation policies. We are interested in how 
consumers evaluate price-based allocation policies, and especially what role collective 
health outcomes play in the allocation policy evaluation process. Therefore we formulate 
the following research question that is addressed in chapters two and three of this thesis: 
Research question 1: How do consumers evaluate price-based 
priority access allocation policies, and more specific: What is the 
role of individual and collective health outcomes in the consumer 
evaluation process of such price-based allocation policies? 
1.1.2 Chapter 2: Collective health outcomes and health consequences 
Little is known about how consumers evaluate price-based priority access allocation 
policies. We use studies in two countries that have totally different health care settings 
(i.e., the Netherlands versus the United States of America) to address some interesting 
issues with regard to this gap in the literature. First of all, we investigate the direct 
relationship of price-based priority access allocation policies on collective health outcome 
evaluations. It is interesting to test how price-based priority access allocation policies 
affect consumers’ collective health outcome evaluations, because these evaluations likely 
have a huge impact on the overall consumer attitude towards such policies. Then, we 
address a possible moderating effect of health consequence of treatment on the collective 
health outcome allocation policy evaluation relationship and offer an explanation of our 
findings by means of luxury-necessity theory (Berry, 1994; Kemp, 1996; Kemp, 1998; 
Mahoney, Kemp, & Webley, 2005). Finally, we scrutinize the effect of price-based priority 
access allocation policies on the collective health outcome evaluations in case of additional 
supply, that is, when patients are offered the option to pay extra for treatment that takes 
place outside, instead of within, regular working hours of the hospital. This is of 
paramount importance because it eliminates possible disadvantages for total health 
outcomes, since treatment for regular patients is not delayed, and consumer attitude 
towards such price-based policies might be much more positive than price-based priority 
access policies in which treatment takes place within the regular working hours of the 
hospital. 
Introduction 
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1.1.3 Chapter 3: Collective health outcomes and psychological distance 
To deal with the scarcity of service resources, public policy makers implement allocation 
policies to assign service access to consumers. Oftentimes, allocation decisions create 
conflicts between different interests: collective vs. individual, or efficiency (total) vs. 
equity (distributional) focal outcomes. In chapter three we investigate how such allocation 
policies (i.e., individual outcome based vs. collective outcome based policies, and 
efficiency based vs. equity based policies) that lead to conflicting health outcomes are 
evaluated over psychological distance. We propose that consumers mentally represent 
these outcomes at different levels of abstraction, and investigate how allocation policy 
evaluations are affected by the psychological distance that is inherently present in the 
decision context by means of two experiments in the health care domain. We expect that 
evaluations are more positive if there is congruency1. Moreover, we explore whether 
consumers’ personal experience with the object of evaluation (i.e., health care treatment) 
activates a concrete mindset that diminishes the effect of the mindset activated by the 
psychological distance in the decision situation.  
 This chapter is based on construal level theory which states that outcomes or 
events are evaluated differently over psychological distance due to a difference in their 
mental representation. More precisely, abstract (high-level) construals are evaluated more 
positively in a psychologically far situation, whereas concrete (low-level) construals are 
more positively evaluated in a psychologically close situation (Liberman & Trope 1998; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
1.2 Customized Care 
1.2.1 Chapter 4: Collective costs and benefit evaluations of customized care 
For patients, full customization of care according to their preferences would be optimal 
because it maximizes their utility. Yet, there is little guidance about how the costs and 
benefits of non-health-related aspects of care can be measured, organized, and used in 
medical decision making to evaluate (customized) health care programs. In chapter four we 
propose and test a discrete choice experiment (DCE) based approach to use these costs and 
benefits to evaluate (customized) health care programs in which non-health-related aspects 
of care play a role by using individual-specific DCE estimates. The approach is illustrated 
                                                          
1
 Congruency means that there is a match in mental representation between the decision context (psychological 
distance) and the information presented on the focal object (policy type). 
Chapter 1 
 
6
for post-treatment breast cancer care. In this chapter (part two of the thesis) we investigate 
the final research question, which is as follows: 
Research question 2: How can the collective costs and benefits of 
customized health care programs be evaluated to support 
management and policy decisions for customized care? 
1.3 The Data 
For study one of chapter two we send an online survey, consisting of several conjoint 
based scenarios, to North American respondents and finally used a dataset of 577 
respondents in our analysis. For study two of chapter two we send an online survey, also 
consisting of several conjoint based scenarios, to Dutch respondents and finally used a 
dataset of 1446 respondents. For study one and two of chapter three we did two online 
experiments among Dutch respondents and, for each study, got a different representative 
dataset (based on age and gender) containing 678 respondents. In chapter four we used 
data of 331 Dutch breast cancer patients based on a choice experiment that they completed 
at home. For an overview of the datasets used in all thesis chapters see Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Description of the datasets used in the thesis 
Chapter Study N Respondents Region Sample Survey Data 
 
2 
 
1 
 
577 
 
Average 
population 
 
North  
America 
 
Ad hoc 
 
Online 
 
Scenario 
based 
conjoint 
  
2 
 
1446 
 
Average 
population 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Representative  
age & gender 
 
Online 
 
Scenario 
based 
conjoint 
 
3 
 
1 
 
678 
 
Average 
population 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Representative  
age & gender 
 
Online 
 
Experiment 
  
2 
 
678 
 
Average 
population 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Representative  
age & gender 
 
Online 
 
Experiment 
 
4 
 
1 
 
331 
 
Patients 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Volunteer 
participants 
 
On paper 
 
Choice 
experiment 
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Chapter 2. Collective Health Outcomes and Health 
Consequences2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Increased competition in the health sector has led hospitals and other institutions to explore 
new allocation mechanisms that move away from traditional expert-based allocation to 
price-based allocation mechanisms. Little is known, however, about consumer evaluations 
of such price-based allocation mechanisms and how these evaluations differ between 
treatments. To fill this gap the authors investigate how consumers evaluate new hospital 
care allocation mechanisms and find that offering individuals the opportunity to pay more 
for faster access to treatment negatively affects their evaluations of both total and 
distributional collective health outcomes of a hospital's care. Furthermore, the effects of 
these two key collective outcome evaluations on consumers' attitude towards allocation 
mechanisms are found to be moderated by the health consequence of a treatment (life 
saving vs. life improving). Finally, the authors find that offering more flexible health care 
operations that are less restricted in terms of supply (i.e., treatment outside versus within 
the regular working hours of the hospital) affect total collective health outcome evaluations 
positively instead of negatively. The results of this chapter are helpful for marketing 
managers that consider implementing new service allocation policies, in particular in 
health care management. 
2.1 Introduction 
Price-based allocation mechanisms are increasingly proposed as a viable strategy to 
allocate access to services in semi-public domains such as health care, education, and 
recreation (Brouwer & Schut, 1999; Lewis & Sappington, 1995). Access to the most 
sought after services and at the most popular service times is typically limited in these 
domains and not all consumers can be served at their most preferred time                     
(e.g., Boyd & Potter, 1986; Govind, Chatterjee, & Mittal, 2008). In such instances      
price-based allocation mechanisms (e.g., market-based priority access pricing) are an 
economically efficient way to allocate service access (Brouwer & Hermans, 1999; Carlton, 
                                                          
2
 Based on Benning and Dellaert (2010). 
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1991). However, consumers and policy makers do not always prefer to use such 
mechanisms to gain access to services (Anderson et al., 1997). In particular because   
price-based allocation mechanisms can result in distributions with very unequal access 
levels between consumers (Petrou & Wolstenholme, 2000; Vagero, 1994). 
 This hesitancy to use price-based allocation mechanisms is perhaps most 
prominent in the field of health care where different levels of access                     
(e.g., differences in service waiting time) have strong health implications for the individual 
(Fryer, Pellar, Ormond, Koffron, & Abecassis, 2003; Stremersch, 2008). Yet, high 
pressure on budgets, policy trends towards deregulation of government activities, and 
increased competition still lead hospitals and other health care institutions to experiment 
with new price-based allocation mechanisms (Cutler, 2002; Rice, 1997). Such priority 
access pricing moves away from traditional non-price-based allocation mechanisms like 
doctors’ expert decisions to allocate patients to treatments based on medical urgency or 
allocations based on a first-come-first-served principle (Evans, Vossler, & Flores, 2009). 
While in some instances the pricing process is implemented through intermediary markets 
(e.g., through health maintenance organizations in the US) increasingly health care 
providers are also exploring the possibility to interact directly with patients in the access 
allocation process. For example, recently a well known Dutch hospital experimented with 
allowing individuals to have priority access to treatments in exchange for higher health 
care fees. This initiative led to a large political and public opinion backlash, despite the 
hospital’s insistence that the new allocation process improved the overall efficiency of the 
hospital’s care system and did not come at the expense of other patients (Den Exter, 2010). 
 To date, the question how consumers evaluate price-based vs. non-price-based 
allocation mechanisms has received only little attention in the literature. Notable 
exceptions are Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), who reported that in the case of 
football tickets non-price-based allocation mechanisms (i.e., waiting lines) are preferred by 
consumers over price-based allocation mechanisms (i.e., auctions), and Anderson et al. 
(1997), who found that there is only limited patient support for paying physicians directly 
to shorten patient waiting times. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to develop a 
better understanding of the consumer evaluation process of price- vs. non-price-based 
priority access allocation mechanisms, with a particular emphasis on the role of 
consumers’ evaluations of collective health outcomes in the context of health care 
allocation mechanisms.  
 First, drawing on recent research on altruism in individual decision making    
(Fehr & Schmidt, 2006), we propose that the effect of a health care allocation mechanism 
on consumer attitude towards this mechanism is determined not only by the consumer’s 
Collective Health Outcomes and Health Consequences 
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evaluation of his or her own personal chance of treatment and the personal costs involved 
in participating in the allocation mechanism, but also by the consumer’s evaluation of the 
collective health outcome of the mechanism since individuals also care about the health of 
others (Jacobsson, Carstensen, & Borgquist, 2005). In particular, we anticipate that based 
on consumer intuitions about the effects of income inequality in markets for scarce 
resources (Van Doorslaer & Wagstaff, 1992) their evaluations of the collective outcomes 
of a health care allocation mechanism are negatively affected by the introduction of    
price-based allocation mechanisms, which in turn lowers their attitude towards price-based 
allocation mechanisms. We demonstrate this effect both for consumer evaluations of the 
total collective health outcome of an allocation mechanism (i.e., the total health gain 
obtained by implementing the allocation mechanism) and the distributional collective 
health outcome (i.e., the distribution of health gains across individuals due to the allocation 
mechanism).  
 Second, we also investigate if the relative importance of total versus distributional 
collective health outcome evaluations on consumer attitude towards allocation mechanisms 
is moderated by the health impact of a health care treatment (i.e., life saving vs. life 
improving). In particular, we hypothesize that for treatments with less severe 
consequences, the relative importance of distributional health outcomes is reduced in favor 
of total health outcomes. We base this expectation on research on differences in consumer 
allocation preferences between luxury vs. necessity products that suggests that consumers’ 
collective distribution considerations are stronger for necessity products (Kemp, 1998).  
 Finally, we investigate if a potential mechanism to overcome the anticipated 
negative effect of price-based priority access allocation mechanisms on consumers’ 
collective health outcome evaluations is to expand a hospital’s regular service schedule. 
More specifically, we expect that if treatments to patients paying for priority access are 
given outside of regular hospital working hours, consumers perceive a positive effect of 
price-based allocation mechanisms on the total collective health outcome, even though 
they still perceive a negative effect of price-based allocation on the distributional collective 
health outcome. 
 We test the proposed relationships empirically using two online panel surveys in 
which respondents were asked to evaluate both price-based and non-price-based health 
care allocation mechanisms in the context of hospital treatment. Study 1 used a North 
American sample from a volunteer consumer panel (N=590) and Study 2 used a sample 
from a Dutch marketing research consumer panel (N=1464) which was representative of 
the population in terms of age and gender. We find that our results generalize across these 
two samples drawn from very different health care market settings. 
Chapter 2 
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2.2 Consumers and Price-Based Priority Access Allocation in Health 
Care  
In recent years, price-based mechanisms have received growing attention from policy 
makers and managers as a way to allocate (semi-) public services to consumers because it 
is seen as a potentially powerful approach to promote economic efficiency and welfare 
gains (Brouwer & Hermans, 1999; Carlton, 1991). In particular, providing consumers with 
the opportunity to pay for priority access has been suggested as a way to more efficiently 
allocate access in domains such as health care (Brouwer & Hermans, 1999; Brouwer & 
Schut, 1999), recreation (Sandrey, Buccola, & Brown, 1983), and transportation 
(Newbery, 1988; Newbery, 1994). Different pricing allocation mechanisms have been 
proposed across these different applications and they include auctions, congestion-based 
flexible prices, and relatively fixed tariff schemes. 
 We investigate consumers’ evaluations of such price-based priority access 
allocation mechanisms. Economic theory suggests that consumers’ evaluations of their 
own personal costs and benefits associated with an allocation mechanism should drive 
their attitude towards the mechanism (Becker, 1976; Frey, 1999; Lazear, 2000). However, 
there is also increasing evidence that consumers take into account the collective interests of 
other consumers when evaluating different ways to allocate resources (e.g., Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1986). This effect is also 
likely to be relevant for health care (Jacobsson et al., 2005). 
 
2.2.1 Consumers’ collective health outcome evaluations 
To describe consumers’ collective health outcome evaluations of allocation mechanisms 
we distinguish between two key collective concerns that drive individuals’ evaluations: 1. 
Total collective health outcome expresses the expected total gain in health that results from 
the application of an allocation mechanism (i.e., the efficiency of the allocation 
mechanism) and 2. Distributional collective health outcome expresses how equally the 
health outcome resulting from the allocation mechanism is distributed among individuals 
(i.e., the equity of the allocation mechanism) (Dolan & Robinson, 2001; Nord, Pinto, 
Richardson, Menzel, & Ubel, 1999; Wagstaff, 1991). 
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Research findings in health care demonstrate that individuals are often willing to sacrifice 
some part of the total collective health outcome (typically expressed in terms of total 
Quality of Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) saved) in return for a better distributional 
collective health outcome (a more equitable distribution of QALYs) (Andersson & 
Lyttkens, 1999; Johannesson & Gerdtham, 1996; Ratcliffe, 2000; Schwappach, 2003). 
These findings underline that individuals’ evaluations of both total and distributional 
collective health outcomes are likely to play a substantial role when consumers evaluate 
allocation mechanisms (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual model and hypotheses 
 
Price-based priority access allocation mechanisms are likely to influence consumers’ 
collective health outcome evaluations. Recently, hospitals have experimented with such 
allocation mechanisms by charging a fixed amount for priority access to treatment at 
certain reserved time slots in the week (den Exter, 2010). Thus, these mechanisms offer 
individuals the opportunity to advance their medical treatment by paying an extra fee. The 
resulting shifts in treatment priority access are likely to influence collective health 
outcomes. The reason is that compared to non-price-based allocation mechanisms         
(i.e., expert-based allocation or first-come-first-served principles) price-based priority 
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access allocation mechanisms assign patients also on the basis of their willingness to pay 
for faster access to health care. Thus, in price-based priority access allocation mechanisms 
medical urgency is a relatively less important determinant of speed of access to health care. 
For example, high income patients may have a higher willingness-to-pay for priority 
access than low income patients and therefore priority access pricing is likely to result in 
faster average access to health care for high income patients compared to low income 
patients, which in turn affects collective health outcomes.  
 We expect that consumers also take the existence of such additional                 
(i.e., non-medical urgency based) drivers of willingness-to-pay into account when 
evaluating the expected collective health outcomes of price-based priority access allocation 
mechanisms. More specifically, we expect that consumers anticipate that allowing for 
price-based priority access has a negative impact on total collective health outcomes 
compared to non-price-based allocation mechanisms because non-medical urgency based 
criteria become more important in determining the final outcome. We also expect that 
distributional collective health outcome evaluations are negatively affected, because     
non-medical urgency criteria are likely to increase the differences between relatively 
healthy and relatively less healthy individuals, as less healthy individuals are somewhat 
less likely to receive treatment fast (e.g., because they tend to have lower incomes). 
 
 H1: A price-based priority access allocation mechanism 
for a fixed number of health care time slots negatively 
affects consumers’ evaluation of (a) total collective health 
outcomes and (b) distributional collective health 
outcomes compared to a non-price-based access 
allocation mechanism. 
 
2.2.2 The moderating role of health care impact 
Previous research shows that individuals’ preferences for the allocation of health care 
resources differ depending on the nature of the medical condition for which the decisions 
are made (Furnham, Thomson, & McClelland, 2002; Johri, Damschroder, Zikmund-Fisher, 
& Ubel, 2005; Furnham, Ariffin, & McClelland, 2007). In this study we specifically focus 
on the role of the health impact of a treatment on the importance individuals’ attach to 
different criteria when evaluating allocation mechanisms. In particular we hypothesize that 
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there are differences depending on whether a treatment is life saving or life enhancing. 
Furnham, Thomson, and McClelland (2002), for example, found that – although 
allocations towards lower aged, lower income, and non-smoking patients are preferred for 
both a cosmetic and a heart transplantation treatment – the effect of patient income level on 
respondents’ priority ranking of hypothetical patients was much higher for a cosmetic  
(i.e., life enhancing) treatment in contrast to a heart transplantation (i.e., life saving) 
treatment. This suggests that health consequences play an important role in how 
individuals evaluate different allocation criteria, in particular income.  
 We propose that these observed differences in preferences for allocations due to 
the health consequence of a treatment (i.e., life improving vs. life saving) can be explained 
by differences in the importance consumers attach to total and distributional collective 
health outcomes for different health consequences. We expect that consumers place more 
weight on distributional health outcomes for a treatment with life saving consequences 
relative to a treatment with life improving consequences, due to the difference in emphasis 
that consumers place on the total vs. distributional collective outcomes in decisions for 
luxury vs. necessity goods (Kemp & Bolle, 1999).  
 In general, individuals prefer that the distribution of luxuries should be left to the 
market, while the distribution of scarce necessities should be regulated (Berry, 1994; 
Kemp, 1996; Kemp, 1998; Mahoney, Kemp, & Webley, 2005). We expect that compared 
to a treatment with life saving consequences, consumers consider a treatment with only life 
improving consequences to be less of a necessity and a more luxury type of good (Kemp, 
1998). This is also reflected in the fact that consumers are likely to find life improving 
treatments less important compared to life saving treatments (Kemp & Bolle, 1999). Based 
on these considerations we hypothesize that for life improving health care treatments 
consumers attach relatively less weight to distributional collective health outcomes 
compared to total collective health outcomes than in the case of life saving health care 
treatments. 
 
 H2: The relative impact of distributional collective health 
outcome evaluations (compared to total collective health 
outcome evaluations) on consumers’ attitude towards an 
access allocation mechanism is lower for health care 
treatments that have life improving vs. life saving 
consequences. 
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2.3 Study 1: North American Sample 
In Study 1 we use North American data to empirically test H1a, H1b, and H2. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
Sample 
We obtained data by means of an online questionnaire that was sent to members of a North 
American online consumer panel. Participants received $5 for their participation. 590 
completed surveys were obtained, of which data of 13 respondents were deleted because of 
missing or incorrect responses. Thus, a total of 577 completed questionnaires were used in 
the final data analysis. The average age of respondents was 40.63 years (ranging from 18 
to 75 years), 73 % of the respondents were female, and all respondents lived in the U.S. 
Moreover, the average duration time of the survey was about 23 minutes. 
Procedure 
The questionnaire started with an introduction about the structure of the study. 
Respondents were asked to consider possible scenarios in which hospitals were exploring 
new health care allocation policies. Then, respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
four hypothetical health care scenarios in which they were presented with hypothetical 
hospitals. These hospitals were identical in all respects except for the health care allocation 
mechanisms they used. All allocation mechanisms were explained in detail to the 
respondents (see experimental conditions section below) and it was tested if participants 
understood the information presented to them before they could continue. 
 Respondents answered questions on three (of seven possible) policies of the 
hospitals in question (see measures section below). All hospital policies were the same 
across scenarios and the selection of the three hospital policies per respondent was 
systematically rotated across respondents per scenario (in seven different ways) to average 
across possible order effects. This resulted in 28 versions of the questionnaire               
(i.e., four health care scenarios each with the seven rotations of three different hospital 
policies) that were randomly assigned to respondents. The questionnaire ended with 
several socio-demographic questions. 
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Experimental conditions 
A 2*2 between subjects design was used to create the health care scenarios. The first 
experimental scenario variable described the health consequence of treatment (a life 
improving ear correction treatment vs. a life saving liver transplantation treatment) and 
was used to test H2. The second experimental variable described the funding structure of 
the hospital (public vs. private). This second variable was included to control for 
respondents beliefs about the type of hospital which could also affect their sensitivity for 
total vs. distributional collective health outcomes. However, no significant main or 
interaction effects of this second variable were found in the analysis and therefore its 
experimental conditions were collapsed in the data analysis reported in the chapter. 
 The health care allocation mechanisms were described using a 2*3 full factorial 
design of price-based vs. non-price-based allocation for three different types of allocation 
processes (i.e., lottery, waiting list, and expert-based selection procedure). The price-based 
allocation mechanisms were described to respondents as pricing mechanisms in which the 
hospitals offered two rates for each treatment; a priority access price and a fixed price. The 
priority price was described as being 10 % higher than the fixed price, and provided 
patients with a 10 % higher chance of being admitted to treatment at any given moment in 
time (compared to regular patients, with identical medical needs). The non-price-based 
allocation mechanisms were described as allocation mechanisms in which there was only 
one price for treatment for all patients. Finally, as an additional (price-based) allocation 
mechanism, an auction mechanism was also included that inherently combines pricing and 
the allocation of care by allowing consumers to bid on priority access. The different 
allocation mechanisms are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Attributes and attribute levels of allocation mechanisms for Study 1 
Attributes Attribute levels Description of attribute levels 
Price-based  
 
Hospitals offer two rates for each treatment, a regular price and a priority 
access price. The priority access price is 10% higher than the regular price 
and provides patients with a 10% higher chance of being admitted to 
treatment at any given moment in time compared to other patients with 
identical medical needs, that have chosen to pay the regular price.  
Pricing  
 
Non-price-
based  
 
Hospitals always ask the same price for a treatment. 
 
Waiting list 
 
 
The longer a patient is waiting for the treatment the earlier he/she will be 
treated. 
 
Lottery 
 
Patients are randomly selected for treatment with equal probability. 
 
Allocation  
process 
 
Expert-based   
selection  
procedure 
 
 
Patients are ranked for treatment access based on a measure that takes into 
account the degree of illness, life style and the expected total number of 
quality adjusted life years (QALYs) gained after treatment. This measure is a 
product of gains in quality and length of life. 
  
Auction 
 
 
Patients are able to bid an amount they would like to pay for priority access 
status. Multiple bids per person are possible (ascending auction). The 
patients with the highest bids receive priority access. 
 
Measures 
We measured attitude towards the allocation mechanism by four items based on Dabholkar 
(1996). Collective health outcome evaluations are measured separately for total and 
distributional health outcomes. These self-created multi-item measures are based on 
previous research on efficiency and equity of health care interventions (Nord et al., 1999; 
Wagstaff, 1991) in accordance with our earlier definitions of total and distributional health 
outcomes.  
 All outcome constructs were initially measured using three items. After testing 
one item was deleted from each construct to improve measurement performance            
(see Appendix A). The control variables for individual outcomes are measured by a 
respondent’s evaluation of the own chance of treatment and own payment amount. Finally, 
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we also measured respondents’ perceived control as a process measure of the allocation 
mechanism using three items adapted and extended from Dabholkar (1996). The control 
construct is later used as marker variable to test for common method bias in our analysis. 
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis was used to verify the factor structure of the 
different measures. We used data of each respondent of one randomly selected hospital 
policy to prevent potential repeated measures bias (i.e., 577 observations). We analyzed 
several measures of fit which all indicate a good to acceptable model fit: Chi-Square/Df 
ratio is 1.82, RMSEA is .04, and high scores for measures GFI: .99, and CFI: .99. To test 
for discriminant validity we compared the average variance extracted within factors with 
the square of the bivariate correlations between factors (Fornell & Larker, 1981). For the 
four constructs of interest the variance extracted was .84 for the total collective health 
outcome, .83 for the distributional collective health outcome, .87 for the own chance of 
treatment, and .89 for the own payment construct. The squares of the correlations between 
the factors varied between .13 and .42. Thus, the average variance extracted (AVE) for 
each construct was greater than the absolute value of the standardized squared correlation 
which shows discriminant validity.  
Common method variance 
We follow Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) recommendations to check for common method 
variance (CMV). To do so we use the control construct, which is theoretically unrelated to 
at least one of our focal constructs, as a marker variable. We take the correlation of the 
control construct with attitude (r = .07) as a base-line measure for CMV. After                 
re-estimating the model including the marker variable to partial out this base-line 
correlation with the marker variable we find that none of the relationships are affected                     
(see Appendix B). This indicates that CMV is not a concern in our data. 
Analytical Model 
Our data have a panel structure because respondents answered questions for three different 
hospital policies. To reflect this structure, we estimate random coefficient regression 
models for our three dependent variables: total collective health outcome evaluation 
( ijtTOTAL ), distributional collective health outcome evaluation 
( ijtONALDISTRIBUTI ), and attitude ( ijtATTITUDE ). The first two models are 
specified in equations 1 and 2. The allocation mechanisms waiting list ( WLjX ), lottery 
( LOTjX ), and doctor’s selection ( SELjX ) are dummy variables coded one if they were the 
hospital’s policy and zero otherwise. The auction is used as a base category and coded 
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zero. In case the waiting list, lottery, or doctor’s selection procedure are price-based, the 
price-based dummy ( PRICEjX ) is coded one, when they are non-price-based this dummy is 
coded minus one. All parameters for the independent variables are estimated as random 
coefficients ( ii νββ += ). 
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Next, we estimate the attitude model which is specified in equation 3. The allocation 
mechanisms ( WLjX , LOTjX , SELjX ) and price-based dummy ( PRICEjX ) are defined as 
before. The total collective health outcome evaluation ( TOTALjX ) and distributional 
collective health outcome evaluation ( ONALDISTRIBUTIjX ) are independent variables in this 
model and were mean centered in the analyses. We also include health consequence of 
treatment ( INGLIFEIMPROVjX ) and its interactions with total and distributional collective 
health outcome evaluations ( INGLIFEIMPROVxTOTALjX , INGLIFEIMPROVxONALDISTRIBUTIjX ). 
Health consequence of treatment (i.e., life improving vs. life saving) is a dummy variable 
coded one if the health consequence of the treatment is life improving and zero if the 
health consequence of the treatment is life saving. We control for (mean centered) 
individual outcome benefit evaluations of the own chance of treatment ( OWNCHANCEjX ) 
and the expected own payment ( OWNPAYMENTjX ). All main effects are estimated as random 
coefficients ( ii νββ += )3. 
                                                          
3
 We also estimated the same model but controlling for age, gender, annual household income (high vs. low), 
education (high vs. low), hospital type (public vs. private), and the interactions of these variables with 
distributional and total collective outcome evaluations. Including these control variables did not change our 
conclusions. 
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2.3.2 Results 
The results are reported in Table 3. They show that as expected price-based priority access 
allocation mechanisms have a negative effect on total and distributional collective health 
outcome evaluations, this provides support for H1a and H1b (Table 3 - Models 1 and 2).  
 We also find support for H2. The interaction of a life improving health 
consequence with the total health outcome and the interaction of a life improving health 
consequence with the distributional health outcome (Table 3 - Model 3) show that health 
care treatments with life improving consequences increase the effect of total collective 
health outcome evaluations, and decrease the effect of distributional collective health 
outcome evaluations on consumer attitude towards the allocation mechanism compared to 
treatments with life saving consequences. 
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Table 3:  Results of Study 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable Total  
health outcome 
Distributional  
health outcome 
Allocation 
mechanism attitude 
 Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Constant )(α  -.71** .51** -1.22** 
 
.00 3.48** .44** 
Price-based (H1a and H1b) 
)( iPRICEβ  
-.10** 
 
.03 -.28** 
 
.12** -.15** 
 
.13** 
Lottery  
)( iLOTβ  
.22** .59** .87** 
 
.62** .42** 
 
.27** 
Waiting list  
)( iWLβ  
.93** 
 
.40** 1.58** 
 
.76** .71** 
 
.28** 
Selection   
)( iSELβ  
1.34** 
 
.46** 1.82** 
 
.94** .45** 
 
.29** 
Total  health outcome 
 )( iTOTALβ  
    .25** 
 
.08 
Distributional health outcome 
)( IONALiDISTRIBUTβ  
    .26** 
 
.16** 
Own chance of treatment  
 )( iOWNCHANCEβ  
    .34** 
 
.17** 
Own payment 
)( TiOWNPAYMENβ  
    .12** .16** 
Life improving 
 health consequence  
)( VINGiLIFEIMPROβ  
    .01 .11** 
 
Total health outcome x  
Life improving health consequence (H2)  
)( EIMPROVINGiTOTALxLIFβ  
    .16**  
 
Distributional health outcome 
x Life improving health consequence 
(H2)  
)( IMPROVINGIONALxLIFEiDISTRIBUTβ
 
    -.11**  
* p < .05 ** p < .01  
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2.3.3 Conclusion and discussion 
In this first study we provide evidence for our hypotheses. There is a negative effect of 
priority access pricing on total and distributional collective health outcome evaluations 
(H1a-b). Also, the effect of distributional collective health outcome evaluations on consumer 
attitude decreases compared to that of total collective health outcome evaluations in case of 
a health care treatment with life improving consequences vs. a treatment with life saving 
consequences (H2). This finding is interesting because it indicates that in health care 
allocation decisions in which lives are at stake (i.e., with life saving consequences) 
distributional aspects have a stronger effect on allocation mechanism attitude than if life 
improvement is the main goal. Hospital managers should take this into account when they 
consider the different allocation policies they may implement. Allocation mechanisms that 
lead to a more equal distribution of (quality adjusted) life years saved among individuals 
are more dominant in consumers’ evaluations for treatments with life saving consequences 
than for treatments with life improving consequences. We investigate further details about 
this effect in Study 2. 
2.4 Study 2: Dutch Sample 
The purpose of Study 2 was threefold. First, respondents in Study 1 recognized that price-
based priority access allocation mechanisms – although economically more efficient – may 
increase the probability that patients that are less in need of treatment are treated faster. 
This lowered their total collective health outcome evaluations, and it is worthwhile to 
investigate if this negative impact of price-based allocation mechanisms on total collective 
health outcome evaluations could be overcome by offering health care operations that are 
less restricted in terms of supply (i.e., by offering more flexible hours of operation). To do 
so, Study 2 introduces an additional allocation mechanism condition. This condition 
describes a price-based allocation of priority access to care that is available only for 
treatment outside regular working hours of the hospital. In this new condition, patients that 
pay extra for priority access are treated outside the regular working hours of the hospital, 
which eliminates disadvantages for total health outcomes because treatment for regular 
patients is not delayed by the priority access policy.  
 We expect that consumers recognize this distinction and adjust their evaluation of 
total health outcomes accordingly (see Figure 2). However, at the same time the new 
policy should only increase consumers’ evaluations of total collective health outcomes 
(which can increase with additional supply) but not distributional collective health 
outcomes because the latter still remains relatively more unequal across patients (compared 
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to non-price-based allocation policies) because of differences in patients’ willingness and 
ability to use price-based access to care. This leads us to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 H3: A price-based priority access allocation mechanism in 
which patients that pay for faster access are treated 
outside of regular working hours has (a) a positive effect 
on consumers’ evaluations of the total collective health 
outcome and (b) a negative effect on consumers’ 
distributional collective health outcome evaluations 
compared to a non-price-based allocation mechanism. 
 
The second objective of Study 2 is to provide more detailed process-level support for the 
proposed mechanism underlying the observed moderating effect of health consequences. 
We drew on luxury/necessity theory to anticipate that individuals prefer that the 
distribution of luxuries should be left to the market, while the distribution of scarce 
necessities should be regulated (Berry, 1994; Kemp, 1996; Kemp, 1998; Mahoney et al., 
2005). Therefore, given the observed moderating effects in Study 1, we expect that a 
treatment with life improving consequences should be perceived as more of a luxury good 
while a treatment with life saving consequences should be seen as a necessity good by 
consumers. In Study 2 we explicitly measure consumer’s evaluations of the aspects that 
reflect Kemp’s theoretical distinction between necessities and luxury goods (i.e., luxury 
perception and perceived importance).  
 To further strengthen this explanation, we also rule out an alternative explanation 
for our findings by controlling for a potential shift in the perceived fairness of the 
allocation mechanism for different health consequences. In recent years experimental 
economists have gathered evidence that suggests that individuals are strongly motivated by 
concerns for fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Consumers’ fairness evaluations of 
allocation mechanisms are therefore likely to also affect their attitude towards allocation 
mechanisms and are now controlled for in the analysis. 
 The third objective of Study 2 is to test if our findings generalize to consumers in 
a very different health care market than the US health care market. Therefore we collect 
data from a different market setting. In particular we analyze data from a general 
population sample in the Netherlands.  
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2.4.1 Method 
Sample 
We obtained data by means of an online questionnaire that was sent to members of a Dutch 
online consumer panel. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two versions of 
the questionnaire and received €5 for participation. 1464 completed surveys were obtained, 
of which data of 18 respondents were deleted because of missing or incorrect responses. 
Thus, a total of 1446 completed questionnaires were used in the final data analysis. The 
sample was drawn from a large online pool of participants to be representative for the 
Dutch population based on age and gender. The average age was 46.11 years (ranging 
from 18-83 years) and 51.7 % of the respondents were female. The average duration for 
completing the questionnaire was 11 minutes. 
Procedure 
Respondents started the questionnaire with a short introduction about the structure of the 
study and were presented with one out of two hypothetical health care scenarios (life 
saving vs. life improving). They were asked to consider possible scenarios in which 
hospitals were exploring new health care allocation policies. Then they were presented 
three different hypothetical hospitals. These were identical in all respects except for the 
health care allocation mechanisms they used. Respondents answered questions about all 
three hospitals’ allocation policies (see measures section below). After this task they also 
answered some questions to measure the luxury-necessity degree of the two treatment type 
manipulations (i.e., live saving (liver transplantation treatment) vs. life improving          
(ear correction treatment)) and the perceived fairness of the allocation policies. The survey 
ended with several socio-demographic questions. 
Experimental conditions 
A 2*3 between and within subjects design was used. The two levels described the health 
consequence of treatment (a life improving ear correction treatment vs. a life saving liver 
transplantation treatment) and were used to test H2 in the different health market setting. 
The three levels were a within subject manipulation of health care allocation mechanisms. 
These were described as: non-price-based allocation, price-based allocation within the 
regular working hours of the hospital, and price-based allocation outside of the hospitals’ 
regular working hours. Only one type of allocation process was used in Study 2. The non-
price-based allocation mechanism was a mechanism that uses a waiting list with an 
average waiting time of eight months in which there is no option to pay for earlier 
treatment and fully covered costs of treatment. The price-based allocation mechanisms 
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were identical to the non-price-based allocation mechanism except for the fact that they 
offered patients the option to be treated earlier (i.e., within 1 month instead of 8 months) 
when they paid €900 extra out of their own pocket (not covered by health insurance). The 
price-based allocation mechanisms were used to test H1a, H1b, H3a, and H3b. The survey 
specified that in case of a price-based allocation mechanism in which treatment takes place 
outside the regular working hours of the hospital other patients on the waiting list did not 
have to wait longer for treatment. In case of a price-based allocation mechanism in which 
treatment takes place within the regular working hours of the hospital, respondents were 
told other patients did have to wait longer.  
Measures 
We measured attitude towards the allocation mechanism by four items based on Dabholkar 
(1996). Collective health outcome evaluations are measured separately for total and 
distributional health outcomes (Nord et al., 1999; Wagstaff, 1991). Each construct was 
measured by three-item scales (see Appendix C). The control variables for individual 
outcomes are measured by a respondent’s evaluation of the own chance of treatment and 
own payment amount and also consist of three-item scales. To measure consumer’s 
evaluations of the aspects that reflect Kemp’s theoretical distinction between necessities 
and luxury goods we included two additional questions to measure (Kemp & Bolle, 1999): 
(1) to what extent the respondents thought that an ear correction treatment (or a liver 
transplantation treatment) was a necessary vs. luxury type of care, and (2) how important 
they thought this kind of treatment was in general. We also measured respondents’ 
perceived fairness of the policy, which is used as additional control variable, with three 
items (see Appendix C). This construct was based on a scale that measures price fairness 
(Darke & Dahl, 2003; Haws & Bearden, 2006) and adjusted to reflect the perceived 
fairness of a policy. Finally, we measured respondents’ perceived control as a process 
measure of the allocation mechanism using three items as used in Study 1          
(Dabholkar, 1996). This is used as a marker variable to test for common method bias. 
 Confirmatory factor analysis was used to verify the factor structure of the 
different measures. We used data of one randomly selected hospital policy for each 
respondent. We analyzed several measures of fit which all indicate a good to acceptable 
model fit: Chi-Square/Df ratio is 7.11, RMSEA is .07, and high scores for GFI: .95, and 
CFI: .98. 
 To test for discriminant validity we compared the average variance extracted 
within factors with the square of the bivariate correlations between factors               
(Fornell & Larker, 1981). For the five constructs of interest the variance extracted was .80 
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for the total health outcome, .79 for the distributional health outcome, .87 for the own 
chance of treatment, .91 for the own payment, and .88 for the fairness construct. The 
squares of the correlations between the factors varied between .06 and .65. Thus, the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct was greater than the absolute value of 
the standardized squared correlation which shows discriminant validity. 
Common method variance 
We again follow Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) recommendations to check for CMV. We 
use the control construct. In Study 2 control did not have a significant correlation with any 
of our focal constructs; therefore there was no reason to expect problems of common 
method bias. We still estimated the model including control and found that none of the 
relationships are affected (see Appendix D). Thus, CMV is not of concern in Study 2. 
Analytical model 
Our data have a panel structure because respondents answered questions for three different 
hospital policies. To reflect this structure, we estimate random coefficient regression 
models for our three dependent variables: total collective health outcome evaluation 
( ijtTOTAL ), distributional collective health outcome evaluation 
( ijtONALDISTRIBUTI ), and attitude ( ijtATTITUDE ). The first two models are 
specified in equation 4 and 5. The price-based allocation mechanisms in which treatment 
takes place within and outside the regular working hours of the hospital           
( INPRICEjX − , OUTPRICEjX − ) are dummy variables coded one if they were the hospital’s 
policy and zero otherwise. The non-price-based mechanism is used as a base category and 
coded zero. All main effects are estimated as random coefficients ( ii νββ += ). 
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Next, we estimate the attitude model which is specified in equation 6. The price-based 
allocation mechanisms ( INPRICEjX − , OUTPRICEjX − ) are defined as before. The total 
collective health outcome evaluation ( TOTALjX ) and the distributional collective health 
outcome evaluation ( ONALDISTRIBUTIjX ) are independent variables in this model and are 
mean centered in the estimation. We also include the health consequence of treatment 
( INGLIFEIMPROVjX ) and its interactions with total and distributional collective health 
outcome evaluations ( INGLIFEIMPROVxTOTALjX , INGLIFEIMPROVxONALDISTRIBUTIjX ). Health 
consequence of a treatment (i.e., life improving vs. life saving) is a dummy variable coded 
one if the health consequence of the treatment is life improving and zero if the health 
consequence of the treatment is life saving. We control for (mean centered) individual 
outcome benefit evaluations of the own chance of treatment ( OWNCHANCEjX ), the expected 
own payment ( OWNPAYMENTjX ), and fairness ( FAIRNESSjX ). All main effects are estimated 
as random coefficients ( ii νββ += )4. 
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 As in Study 1 we also estimated a model that included age, gender, income (high vs. low), education (high vs. 
low), and the interaction effects of these variables with the two key benefit evaluations of the collective health 
outcome as control variables. Including these control variables again did not change our conclusions. 
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2.4.2 Results  
The results are reported in Table 4. Like in Study 1, we find a negative main effect of 
price-based priority access on consumers’ evaluations of total and distributional collective 
health outcomes when treatment takes place within the regular working hours of the 
hospital (Table 4 - Models 1 and 2). This provides further support for H1a and H1b. We also 
find a significant interaction of consumers’ distributional collective health outcome 
evaluations with health consequence of treatment and with the expected sign              
(Table 4 - Model 3). The interactions of a life improving health consequence with total and 
distributional health outcome show that health care treatments with life improving 
consequences do not affect the impact of total collective health outcome evaluations, and 
decrease the impact of distributional collective health outcome evaluations on consumer 
attitude towards the allocation mechanism compared to treatments with life saving 
consequences. This provides further support for H2. 
 In addition, we also find support for H3a and H3b. The results demonstrate that a 
price-based priority access allocation mechanism, in which patients that pay extra for 
priority treatment are treated outside of regular hospital working hours, positively affects 
consumers’ evaluations of the total collective health outcome compared to a non-price-
based allocation mechanism (Table 4 - Model 1). We also find that this allocation 
mechanism negatively affects consumers’ distributional collective health outcome 
evaluations compared to a non-price-based allocation mechanism (Table 4 - Model 2). 
 
Chapter 2 
 
28
Table 4:  Results of Study 2 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent 
 variable 
Total  
health outcome 
Distributional  
health outcome 
Allocation 
mechanism attitude 
 Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Constant )(α  .17** 
 
.79** .54** 
 
.66** 3.39** 
 
.15** 
Price-based within opening hours 
(H1a and H1b) 
 )( INiPRICE −β  
-.75** .61** -1.42** 
 
.22** -.33** 
 
.01 
Price-based outside opening hours 
(H3a and H3b)  
)( OUTiPRICE −β  
.27** .32** -.20** 
 
.01 .49** 
 
.03 
Fairness   
)( iFAIRNESSβ  
    .47** .11** 
 
Total health outcome  
)( iTOTALβ  
    .05* 
 
 
.02 
Distributional health outcome  
)( IONALiDISTRIBUTβ  
    .12** 
 
.06** 
 Own chance of treatment 
)( iOWNCHANCEβ  
    .19** 
 
.11** 
Own payment 
)( TiOWNPAYMENβ  
    .05** .09** 
Life improving health consequence 
)( VINGiLIFEIMPROβ  
    .06* .13** 
Total health outcome x  
Life improving health consequence 
 (H2) 
)( EIMPROVINGiTOTALxLIFβ  
    .06 
 
 
Distributional health outcome x life 
improving health consequence 
(H2) 
)( IMPROVINGIONALxLIFEiDISTRIBUTβ
 
    -.09**  
* p < .05. ** p < .01  
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In Study 1 we explained the effect for H2 from the assumption that treatment with a life 
improving health consequence is perceived as more luxurious and treatment with a life 
saving health consequence is perceived as more of a necessity. In Study 2 we are able to 
test this assumption and find that ear corrections are indeed perceived as significantly more 
luxurious than liver transplantations, which supports our proposed process explanation for 
H2 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the lower importance connected to an ear correction 
treatment is also typical of a luxury good and further underlines that an ear correction 
treatment is perceived more as a luxury than a necessity type of care. Given these findings 
we conclude that luxury/necessity theory (Kemp, 1998) offers a valid explanation for why 
a treatment with life improving health consequences, compared to a treatment with life 
saving health consequences, decreases the effect consumer evaluations of the distributional 
health outcome have on the consumer attitude towards allocation mechanisms relative to 
the effect of the total health outcome. 
 
Figure 3: Process level checks of experimental treatment manipulation 
3.87*
4.29*
5.64*
1.90*
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Luxurious Importance
Life improving treatment (ear correction)
Life saving treatment (liver transplantation)
 
* The differences between life improving vs. life saving treatments are significant 
at p < 0.01 for both checks (i.e., luxurious and importance). 
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2.4.3 Conclusion and discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide further support for H1a, H1b and H2. Furthermore, we find 
support for H3a and H3b. After the implementation of a price-based allocation policy in 
which paying patients are treated outside regular hospital working hours, hospitals can 
expect a positive effect on consumer attitude towards the allocation mechanism via the 
positive effect of consumers’ evaluations of the total collective health outcome. Such an 
implementation, however, also influences consumer attitude towards the allocation 
mechanism negatively via consumer evaluations of the distributional collective health 
outcome.  
 Interestingly, the results of Study 2 demonstrate that price-based allocation 
mechanisms do not always have a negative effect on collective health outcome evaluations. 
The introduction of a price-based allocation mechanism in which treatment takes place 
outside of regular opening hours is one example of this.  
 Study 2 also shows that luxury-necessity theory is an effective way to explain 
why consumers’ evaluations of distributional collective health outcomes, compared to total 
collective health outcomes, have less impact on consumers’ attitude towards allocation 
mechanisms when lives are not at stake (i.e., for treatments with a life improving health 
consequence that are regarded as being more a luxury than a necessity type of good). 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Conclusion 
We found support for H1a, H1b and H2 in both studies. In general, price-based allocation 
mechanisms have a negative effect on consumer evaluations of both the total and 
distributional collective health outcome compared to non-price-based allocation 
mechanisms. Furthermore, health care treatments with life improving consequences 
decrease the effect of distributional collective health outcome evaluations relative to the 
effect of total collective health outcome evaluations on consumer attitude towards the 
allocation mechanism compared to treatments with life saving consequences. Study 2 
provided further support that this effect can be explained by luxury/necessity theory 
(Kemp, 1998). Health care treatments with life improving consequences are seen as more 
luxury goods than life saving treatments which are more a necessity. For luxury goods the 
consumers prefer a market mechanism to allocate scarce goods, whereas for necessity 
goods regulation is preferred (Kemp & Bolle, 1999), which is closely related to the goal of 
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reaching a more efficient versus a more equal distribution of scarce resources among 
consumers.  
 In Study 2 we also found support for H3a and H3b. Price-based allocation 
mechanisms in which patients are treated outside the regular working hours of the hospital 
have a positive effect on consumer evaluations of the total collective health outcome and a 
negative effect on consumer evaluations of the distributional collective health outcome 
compared to non-price-based allocation mechanisms. This is an interesting finding because 
it shows that price-based allocation mechanisms do not necessarily have a negative effect 
on consumers’ collective health outcome evaluations.  
 
2.5.2 Theoretical implications 
Although there is a large body of literature that demonstrates that people do not only care 
about their individual outcome when evaluating allocation mechanisms (e.g., Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1986), the specific role of 
collective outcomes in the consumer allocation mechanism evaluation process is still 
relatively unexplored. With this chapter we begin to investigate some important aspects of 
how consumers evaluate outcomes for others in the context of allocation mechanisms. A 
main contribution to the literature lies in the finding that the collective health outcome 
allocation mechanism attitude relationship is moderated by the health consequence of a 
treatment.  
 We also find different effects on total health outcome evaluations for price-based 
allocation of care offered outside versus within normal hospital working hours. This 
second aspect is theoretically interesting, because it demonstrates that consumers are quite 
rational in how they integrate allocation policy details in their overall evaluations, despite 
the relative complexity of some of the policies that were evaluated.  
 Finally, a third theoretically relevant implication of our research is that we found 
very similar results in terms of how individuals evaluate collective health outcomes for 
two different (health) market settings (i.e., the United States and the Netherlands). A priori 
one might have expected that, based on cultural or management practice differences, 
evaluations could have been more different. This result further supports the robustness of 
our findings. 
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2.5.3 Managerial implications 
Our findings are valuable for health care managers that consider implementing new    
price-based allocation mechanisms because they provide guidance in deciding which 
allocation mechanism to implement in different contexts. We address several important 
issues that provide helpful insights for hospitals when choosing between the 
implementation of different allocation mechanisms. First, we show that the consumer 
attitude towards allocation mechanisms is not only influenced by individual outcomes that 
result from the allocation, but that collective outcomes (both total and distributional) play 
an important role too (e.g., the R² of the model in equation three is .62, without collective 
outcomes the R² is .55). Second, we show that the use of price-based priority access 
allocation mechanisms can influence consumer allocation mechanism attitude in health 
care positively via collective health outcome evaluations when treatment takes place 
outside the regular working hours of the hospital due to the additional supply that is 
offered. Third, this research demonstrates that the distributional health outcome becomes 
less important, relative to the total health outcome, when the health consequence of 
treatment is life improving rather than life saving. 
 Our conclusion is that, from an attitude based consumer perspective, hospitals in 
the United States and the Netherlands should be hesitant to advocate price-based allocation 
mechanisms when treatment takes place within the regular working hours of the hospital. 
The reason is that such policies may harm patient satisfaction and gather low public 
support. However, when treatment takes place outside the regular working hours of the 
hospital price-based allocation mechanisms seem to be very attractive and should 
definitely be taken into consideration for implementation in the future. 
 
2.5.4 Limitations and further research 
There are some issues that could be addressed in future research. First, we distinguished 
between treatments with life saving and life improving consequences by respectively using 
liver transplantation treatment and ear correction treatment manipulations to test H2. 
Although we found support for this hypothesis in both studies we were not able to test our 
results across a wider range of health applications. It would be interesting to do so in future 
research.  
 Another related aspect is that the results we present are based on general 
population samples. It would be relevant for hospital managers and health care researchers 
to investigate if the use of patient data would lead to the same or different results, for 
example because patients may be more strongly focused on their own health outcomes and 
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less on collective health outcomes for others. We hope to address this question in future 
research.  
 Finally, price-based allocation mechanisms were operationalized by a pricing 
mechanism that offers the option to pay either a fixed price for treatment in general or a 
priority access price for being admitted to treatment earlier. In Study 1 we described the 
priority access price as a price which is 10% higher than the regular price that provides 
patients with a 10% higher chance of being admitted to treatment at any given moment in 
time compared to other patients with identical medical needs that have chosen to pay the 
regular price. In Study 2 we described the priority access price as an additional payment of 
€900. It would be interesting to investigate the case in which this price is much higher. 
Such a high price would more clearly reflect the possibility of generating substantial 
additional income for the hospital that in turn could be used to benefit all patients. This 
option may decrease otherwise negative evaluations because the benefits to society of 
providing high-price priority access are more evident. In conclusion, we hope that the 
insights generated in this chapter trigger future researchers to further investigate these and 
related questions in this important research domain at the crossroads of health care and 
marketing. 
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Chapter 3. Collective Health Outcomes and 
Psychological Distance5 
 
ABSTRACT 
To deal with the scarcity of service resources, managers implement allocation policies to 
assign service access to consumers. Oftentimes, such allocation policies create conflicts 
between different interests: collective vs. individual, and - within the collective outcomes - 
efficiency (total) vs. equity (distributional) outcomes. In this study, we propose that 
consumers mentally represent these allocation outcomes at different levels of abstraction. 
We hypothesize that allocation policy evaluations are more positive if there is congruency 
between the social distance of the allocation policy outcome and the psychological 
distance that is inherently present in many service allocation decision contexts             
(e.g., an implementation of a temporally and/or physically distant policy). We also propose 
that consumers’ personal interests may overrule these expected congruency effects. Two 
experiments in health care confirm our expectations, and we find attenuating effects of 
consumers’ recent experience when individual interests are at stake. 
3.1 Introduction 
The scarcity of service resources in public domains such as health, recreation, and 
education often demands that explicit allocation policies are implemented to assign service 
access to consumers (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Persad, Wertheimer, & 
Emanuel, 2009). For example, doctors may use urgency measures to decide on the order in 
which patients are treated, music fans may be asked to wait in line to get access to tickets 
for special events, and aptitude test scores may be used to allow students access to 
educational programs. When evaluating these allocation policies, consumers are likely to 
consider both their own individual outcomes and the collective outcomes resulting from 
the allocation policy’s mechanism (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; 
Kahneman et al., 1986). Oftentimes, allocation policy decisions create conflicts between 
collective interests vs. interests of different individuals. Thus, consumers’ evaluation of 
allocation policies may be influenced by service providers’ achievement of and consumers’ 
                                                          
5
 Based on Benning, Breugelmans, and Dellaert (2010). 
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focus on each of these outcomes. In this study, we propose that consumers mentally 
represent individual and collective outcomes at different levels of abstraction. Pronin 
(2008), for instance, has shown that different processes are involved between how we see 
ourselves and how we see others. Construal level theory (CLT) predicates that 
psychological distance to the object of evaluation influences consumers’ construal of 
information: increased psychological (temporal, social, spatial or hypothetical) distance 
enhances the abstractness and gives rise to a high-level construal mindset             
(Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). In this perspective, it is shown that 
the outcome for other people is construed as more abstract and at a higher level than one’s 
own outcome (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007; Zhao & Xie, 2010). Therefore, we 
expect that collective outcomes in an allocation policy are construed at a more abstract 
level while individual outcomes are construed at a more concrete level. 
 We further investigate how consumers’ evaluations of these individual vs. 
collective allocation policy outcomes are affected by the psychological distance that is 
inherently present in the allocation policy’s decision context. For example, temporal 
distance in the decision context is caused by the timing of the allocation policy’s launch 
(close vs. far future), while spatial distance is influenced by the closeness of the service 
venue (close vs. far vicinity). Recent research has shown that congruency between 
consumer’s mental representation and the construal level caused by the decision context 
results in greater processing fluency (Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2008; White, MacDonnell, & Dahl 
2010) and enhanced evaluations (Köhler, Breugelmans, & Dellaert, 2010; Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Sanna, Lundberg, Parks, & Chang, 2010; Zhao & Xie, 
2010). Specifically, we hypothesize that consumers place greater emphasis on the 
collective (individual) outcomes of an allocation policy in a more (less) psychologically 
distant context. 
 In addition, when considering the collective outcomes of an allocation policy, 
consumers tend to cognitively balance two different goals that may result from the 
application of an allocation policy mechanism: 1) policies can improve the total collective 
outcomes (reflecting the efficiency of the allocation policy) and 2) policies can ensure 
good distributional collective outcomes (reflecting the equity of the allocation policy)   
(e.g., Dolan & Robinson, 2001; Nord, Pinto, Richardson, Menzel, & Ubel, 1999; Wagstaff, 
1991). Individuals are often willing to sacrifice some part of the total collective outcomes 
in return for better distributional collective outcomes because the latter seems more 
morally correct (Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999; Johannesson & Gerdtham, 1996; Ratcliffe, 
2000; Schwappach, 2003). Given that prior research (Eyal & Liberman 2010; Stephan, 
Liberman, & Trope, 2010) has shown that moral rules reflect social distance, and may 
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produce an abstract, high-level mental representation, it is also important to investigate if 
and how consumers’ evaluations of equity vs. efficiency collective outcomes are 
influenced by a psychologically distant vs. close decision context. We hypothesize that 
consumers place greater emphasis on equity (efficiency) collective outcomes of an 
allocation policy in a more (less) psychologically distant context. 
 Lastly, we explore whether there is a boundary effect that may overrule expected 
congruency effects between the psychological distance inherent in the decision context and 
the focus on collective vs. individual outcomes, or equity vs. efficiency collective 
outcomes. More specifically, we expect that consumers’ strong personal interests in a 
service may interfere with expected congruency effects. For instance, prior research by 
Agerström and Björklund (2009a) has shown that individual differences, such as the 
importance individuals attach to moral values in a moral dilemma, influence their mental 
representations across psychological distances. In this research, we investigate if and how 
a consumer’s personal interest with the service provider’s allocation policy (captured by 
recent experience with the service provider) increases a more concrete and ego-centric 
orientation that may moderate consumers’ allocation policy evaluations. We test our 
hypotheses via two hypothetical experiments in the domain of health care where 
increasingly new care allocation policies are introduced (e.g., market-based priority access 
pricing) that can have strong health implications at both the collective and the individual 
outcome level (Cutler, 2002; Den Exter, 2010) or that differ in their focus on efficiency vs. 
equity collective outcomes (Dolan & Robinson, 2001; Nord et al., 1999; Wagstaff, 1991). 
In the first experiment, we focus on the impact of psychological distance in the decision 
context on the evaluation of individual vs. collective allocation policy outcomes. In the 
second experiment, we focus on the psychological distance’s impact on the evaluation of 
efficiency vs. equity collective allocation policy outcomes. In both experiments, we 
evaluate the moderating effect of consumers’ personal interest.  
3.2 Evaluations of Allocation Policy Outcomes 
3.2.1 Individual vs. collective allocation policy outcomes 
Management decisions on how to allocate service resources to consumers may create 
conflicts between collective interests and interests of different individuals. These conflicts 
are well recognized and have been studied in a managerial and policy context (Lewin, 
1991). Not only companies, but also individual consumers actively take into account the 
interests of others, along with their own self-interest (Agerström & Björklund, 2009a/b), 
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when evaluating allocation policy decisions. At this moment, it is unknown how 
individuals exactly evaluate such conflicting allocation policies. 
 In the current study, we hypothesize that consumers’ evaluation of an allocation 
policy depends on their psychological distance to the outcomes presented in the policy. 
Based on construal level theory (CLT) that argues that consumers focus on different types 
of information depending on their psychological distance to the object of evaluation 
(Kardes, Cronley, & Kim, 2006; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007), we expect that 
consumers mentally represent collective and their own individual outcomes at different 
levels of abstraction. CLT posits that individuals focus on more concrete, low-level 
construals when the psychological distance is close whereas focus is placed on more 
abstract, high-level construals when the psychological distance is far (Trope & Liberman, 
2003). Low-level construals represent information that is concrete and subordinate, and 
highlight the ‘how’ aspects of an object/action, while high-level construals represent 
abstract and superordinate information and highlight the ‘why’ aspects of an object/action 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope et al., 2007).  
Although CLT originated with the temporal distance perspective (near vs. distant 
future; Liberman & Trope, 1998), it has been extended to other dimensions such as spatial, 
hypothetical, or social distance as well (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007). The 
latter (social distance) is especially relevant in the context of selfish hedonistic (individual) 
vs. altruistic moral (collective) targets, where prior research has shown that distal social 
targets (e.g., others) are represented on a more abstract level than proximal social targets 
(e.g., self) (Kim, Zhang, & Li, 2008; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Trope et al., 
2007; Zhao & Xie, 2010). As a consequence, we expect that when evaluating an allocation 
policy that mainly benefits individual (selfish) outcomes, individuals tend to have a more 
concrete mental representation and put more weight on low-level aspects of the decision. 
In contrast, when evaluating an allocation policy that mainly benefits collective (altruistic) 
outcomes, consumers’ mental representation tends to be more abstract and focused on the 
high-level aspects of the decision. We propose that consumers’ evaluations of allocation 
policy outcomes are further dependent on the psychological distance that is inherently 
connected to the decision context (e.g., a decision that is implemented for the distant vs. 
near future, or for a place in the far vs. close vicinity). Prior research has shown that a 
mental representation match (congruency) between the decision context and the 
information presented on the focal object has positive effects on the evaluation of the 
object (Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2008; Köhler et al., 2010; Sanna et al., 2010; Zhao & Xie, 2010). 
The positive effect of congruency can be explained by the value of fit (Zhao & Xie, 2010) 
which increases processing fluency and ease of comprehension (Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2008; 
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Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007; White et al., 2010) and positively affects 
evaluation outcomes like attitude and preference (Köhler et al., 2010; Reber et al., 1998; 
Sanna et al., 2010). For instance, Kim, Zhang and Li (2008) show that responses to a 
concrete (low-level) vs. abstract (high-level) campaign of a fictional political candidate are 
more favored when respondents are told that the campaign would launch one week from 
now (near future) vs. six months from now (distant future), respectively. Zhao and Xie 
(2010) find that a recommendation from others is more persuasive when people make 
decisions for a distant vs. near future consumption. Köhler, Breugelmans and Dellaert 
(2010) show that congruency between the distance inherently connected to the use of an 
interactive decision aid (immediate vs. distant consumption, or immediate vs. delayed 
delivery of recommendations) and the decision aid’s communication design 
(communicating in concrete vs. abstract terms, respectively) increases the likelihood to 
accept the decision aid’s advice. Finally, Agerström and Björklund (2009a/b) find that 
altruistic, moral behaviors are perceived as more important with greater temporal distance 
from the moral dilemma, while concrete, selfish temptations take on more weight when the 
temporal distance from the moral dilemma is near.  
Based on these considerations, we expect that an allocation policy implemented in 
a psychologically distant context (e.g., distant future - ten years from now, or far vicinity - 
somewhere in the country) triggers people to become concerned with altruistic or 
collective outcomes, whereas an allocation policy implemented in a psychologically close 
context (e.g., near future - within one year, or close vicinity - within the neighborhood) 
triggers people to become concerned with selfish or individual outcomes            
(Agerström & Bjorklund, 2009a/b; Eyal & Liberman, 2010). Consequently, we expect that 
congruency between a collective vs. individual outcome based allocation policy and a 
psychologically distant vs. close decision context, respectively results in a more positive 
evaluation of the allocation policy. Hence: 
 
H1a:  In psychologically more distant situations (e.g., when 
considering the distant future or far vicinity), the 
evaluation of an allocation policy that has greater 
collective outcomes increases. 
H1b:  In psychologically closer situations (e.g., when 
considering the proximal future or close vicinity), the 
evaluation of an allocation policy that has greater 
individual outcomes increases. 
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3.2.2 Efficiency vs. equity collective allocation policy outcomes 
Next to a collective vs. individual interest trade-off, allocation policy makers as well as 
individual consumers also recognize the tension between efficiency vs. equity collective 
outcomes, and consider both how the policy affects the total outcome                     
(e.g., the total number of life years saved; efficiency) as well as the distribution of these 
outcomes across consumers (e.g., the distribution of the life years saved; equity) 
(Lindholm, Emmelin, & Rosen, 1997). The health care literature has extensively studied 
how to measure and compare total collective health outcomes and the distribution of these 
outcomes (e.g., Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993; Nord et al., 1999). Regarding policy 
evaluations, prior research has concluded that the majority of (Swedish) politicians are 
prepared to sacrifice some degree of total collective health outcomes to allow for increased 
equity in its distribution (Lindholm, Emmelin, & Rosen, 1997), and also individuals seem 
to be wiling to sacrifice some part of the total collective health outcome in return for a 
better distributional one (Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999; Johannesson & Gerdtham, 1996; 
Ratcliffe, 2000; Schwappach, 2003). 
 An important reason seems to be that people care about equity and equality, even 
when it comes at the cost of the total outcome (e.g., total number of life years saved). 
Within the health sector, it has been found that health maximization does not appear to be 
the only concern when asked about health care priorities (Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999). A 
concept that is often used to calculate the total health improvement resulting from an 
allocation policy is the concept QALYs (Quality of Adjusted Life Years) which is the 
product of gains in quality and length of life (Jacobsson, Carstensen, & Borgquist, 2005; 
Wagstaff, 1991). People may perceive an allocation policy with an unequal distribution but 
higher total number of QALYs saved among patients (treat 100 patients, of which 50 will 
live 20 years and the other 50 will live 5 years longer in full health; total number of 
QALYs saved = 50 x 20 + 50 x 5 = 1250) as less morally correct than an allocation policy 
with an equal distribution but lower total number of QALYs saved among patients (treat 
100 patients, all of which live 10 years longer in full health; total number of QALYs saved 
= 100 x 10 = 1000) (Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999; Johannesson & Gerdtham, 1996). 
 Although both efficiency and equity allocation policy outcomes focus on the 
collective interest, we expect that consumers perceive equity outcomes as more abstract 
than efficiency outcomes for the following reasons. First, Eyal and Liberman (2010) show 
that moral rules reflect social distance and may produce an abstract, high-level mental 
representation. Given that moral concerns are more imperative for equity than efficiency 
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outcomes, we expect that the former induces a higher-level construal than the latter. 
Second, while favoring an efficiency based allocation policy outcome is more rational 
from an economic point of view (striving for the largest possible health outcome) and for 
that reason may trigger a concrete, low-level mental representation, favoring an equity 
based allocation policy outcome seems more morally correct and polite from an emotional 
point of view (striving for an equal health distribution) and may for that reason trigger an 
abstract, high-level mental representation (Stephan et al., 2010). Thus, based on these 
reasons, we expect that when evaluating an allocation policy that mainly benefits equity 
collective outcomes, individuals tend to have a more abstract mental representation than 
when evaluating an allocation policy that mainly benefits efficiency collective outcomes. 
 Based on the congruency effect and the value of fit described above, we expect 
that consumers’ evaluations of efficiency vs. equity collective outcomes are also 
influenced by the psychologically distance in the decision context. A match between the 
social distance of an allocation policy’s focus (efficiency vs. equity outcomes) and the 
psychological distance in the decision context (close vs. far, respectively) results in greater 
processing fluency (Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2008; White et al., 2010) and enhanced evaluations 
(Köhler et al., 2010; Reber et al., 1998). So: 
 
H2a:  In psychologically more distant situations (e.g., when 
considering the distant future or far vicinity), the 
evaluation of an allocation policy that has greater equity 
collective outcomes increases. 
H2b:  In psychologically closer situations (e.g., when 
considering the proximal future or close vicinity), the 
evaluation of an allocation policy that has greater 
efficiency collective outcomes increases. 
3.3 Consumers’ Personal Interests 
In the previous discussion, we assumed that the social distance of the outcome highlighted 
in the allocation policy as well as the psychological distance present in the decision context 
may shape a consumer’s mindset and may influence the focus on a particular kind of 
information (low- vs. high-level) and can even impede the usage of other information 
(Foerster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004). Prior research, however, has shown that also 
consumers’ personal traits may shape internal mindsets and may strengthen situationally 
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induced mindsets (Agerström & Björklund, 2009a). For instance, Agerström and 
Björklund (2009a) find that, within a moral dilemma, moral concerns (as compared to 
selfish concerns) receive a higher weight for temporally distant situations – as would be 
predicted by CLT – mainly among individuals who view moral values as more important 
than hedonistic ones. It is also found that an individual can be either a low-level agent  
(i.e., someone who operates in the world primarily at the level of details) or a high-level 
agent (i.e., someone who routinely views his or her action in terms of causal effects, social 
meanings, and self descriptive implications), and that this internal mindset may determine 
consumers’ way of thinking (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Furthermore, Lee, Keller and 
Sternthal (2010) find that prevention focused individuals tend to construe information at a 
low level while promotion focused individuals are more inclined to construe information at 
a high level, and indicate that external stimuli that fit the internal mindset of the consumer 
have the greatest impact (cf. regulatory fit theory; Higgins, 2000). 
 In this research, we investigate if consumers’ own mindsets may also overrule 
situationally induced mindsets. An important aspect in this context is consumers’ personal 
interest with the object of evaluation (e.g., Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). We expect that 
consumers that have recent experiences related to the object of evaluation are less prone to 
mindset changes that are induced by the decision context, and tend to have more stable 
(personally induced) internal mindsets. Recent experiences represent an immediate instead 
of distant past, and CLT predicates a more concrete versus abstract mindset because recent 
experiences make concrete thoughts more accessible (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Second, a 
more concrete mindset induced by consumers’ personal interest may trigger an ego-centric, 
selfish orientation (Agerström & Björklund, 2009a). The activation of such an internal 
mindset may interfere with well-established and general CLT expectations. We therefore 
expect that an individual with recent hospital experiences activates a more concrete and 
ego-centric mindset, irrespective of the psychological distance inherent in the decision 
context, that diminishes the predicted congruency effect as suggested by the theory leading 
to H1a-b and H2a-b. Hence: 
  
 H3: A consumers’ personal experience with the object of 
evaluation activates a concrete mindset that diminishes 
the effect of the mindset activated by the psychological 
distance in the decision situation. 
  
Collective Health Outcomes and Psychological Distance 
 
43 
We test H1a-b via a hypothetical experiment where we manipulate collective vs. individual 
beneficial outcomes highlighted in the allocation policy, and H2a-b via a hypothetical 
experiment where we manipulate efficiency vs. equity collective beneficial outcomes 
highlighted in the allocation policy. In both experiments, we also manipulate the 
psychological distance inherent in the decision context (close vs. far psychological 
distance), and measure consumers’ personal experience to test H3. 
3.4 Experiment 1 
3.4.1 Method 
Design 
Experiment one had a 2 (individual vs. collective outcome based policy) by 2 (close vs. far 
psychological distance) between-subjects factorial design to test whether people evaluate a 
collective outcome based policy more (less) favorably than an individual outcome based 
policy in a psychological distant (close) situation. To manipulate the focal outcome of the 
allocation policy, we use the QALYs (Quality of Adjusted Life Years) concept. A 
collective outcome based policy is one where the total number of QALYs saved in society 
is relatively high (while the total number of QALYs saved for one’s own is relatively low). 
In contrast, an individual outcome based policy is one where the total number of QALYs 
saved for one’s own is relatively high (while the total number of QALYs saved in society 
is relatively low). To manipulate the psychological distance in the decision context, we use 
a joint spatial and temporal distance manipulation for stronger effects, and told participants 
that the current allocation system of hospitals [in the neighborhood/in the country] became 
out of date and that therefore a new policy [is going to be implemented within one 
year/will be implemented in ten years from now], capturing respectively a close vs. far 
psychological distance6. 
Participants 
A total of 713 panel members of a Dutch research company, representative for the Dutch 
population in terms of gender and age, were asked to complete a short online questionnaire 
about the evaluation of a new allocation policy in the health care sector. Thirty-five 
participants were classified as outlier because they completed the task in an unusual low or 
high amount of time, resulting in a total of 678 participants that were used for data 
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 See Appendix E for a scenario example. 
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analyses. The average age of the participants was 47.54 years within a range of 18-83 years 
and 47.6 % were males.  
Procedure 
Participants received an email invitation to fill out an online questionnaire. After reading 
the introductory text and after providing a clarification of health care terms (like QALYs), 
that was required knowledge to successfully participate in the questionnaire, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. After seeing the 
psychologically close or far decision context, they were asked to evaluate an individual or 
collective outcome based allocation policy. Next, participants received questions related to 
the construal level of the policy’s individual and collective outcomes, and were asked 
whether they or a close family member had been to a hospital for treatment in the past five 
years to capture recent hospital experience. Finally, respondents were asked to answer 
some additional questions (e.g., demographics, etc.), and thanked for their participation. 
The survey took on average about 6.5 minutes to complete. 
Measures 
To measure the main dependent variable, attitude toward the allocation policy, participants 
answered an adapted version of the validated five-item seven-point semantic differential 
scale of Dabholkar (1996) (very bad/very good; very unpleasant/very pleasant; very 
harmful/very beneficial; very unfavorable/very favorable; very unsatisfactory/very 
satisfactory). The five items loaded on the same factor in an exploratory factor analysis 
(eigenvalue = 4.059, 81% of variance explained, loadings ranging from .87 to .93, 
Cronbach’s Į = .94). To measure the construal level of the allocation policy outcomes, 
participants received five seven-point Likert scale questions concerning each aspect 
(collective/high-level vs. individual/low-level outcome) and were asked to assess whether 
it was a/an (a) primary, (b) essential, (c) critical, (d) central, or (e) goal-relevant attribute 
for the evaluation of a new allocation policy. The measures were adapted from Fujita, 
Trope, and Liberman (2006), and Kim, Zhang and Li (2008) and were highly reliable 
(Cronbach’s Į = .95 and .96 for the collective vs. individual outcomes respectively).  
 
3.4.2 Results and discussion 
To check whether the construal levels of our collective vs. individual allocation policy 
outcomes were perceived as expected, we tested whether participants perceived the total 
number of QALYs saved in society as a higher-level construal than the total number of 
QALYs saved for a participant personally. The paired samples t-test revealed that indeed, 
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as expected, the collective outcomes were perceived as more abstract than the individual 
outcomes (μCOLLECTIVE = 4.33 vs. μ INDIVIDUAL = 4.13; t(677) = 3.11, p < .01).  
 Next, we conducted an ANOVA, with attitude toward the allocation policy as 
dependent variable, and policy type (individual vs. collective outcome based policy), 
psychological distance (close vs. far psychological distance), hospital experience      
(recent – own or a family member’s hospitalization in the past five years – vs. no recent 
experience) and all the two- and three-way interactions as independent variables. We found 
a main effect of policy type (F(1, 670) = 6.52, p < .05), as well as a main effect of hospital 
experience (F(1, 670) = 3.96, p < .05), pointing out that respondents evaluate the 
individual outcome based policy more positively than the collective outcome based policy 
(μINDIVIDUAL = 3.85 vs. μCOLLECTIVE = 3.62), and that those with recent experience have 
more positive allocation policy evaluations than those without recent experience 
(μRECENT_EXP = 3.76 vs. μNO_RECENT_EXP = 3.48). No significant effects emerge for any of the 
other main and two-way interaction effects, except for the three-way interaction between 
psychological distance, policy type and hospital experience (F(1, 670) = 4.07, p < .05). 
Figure 4 shows this significant three-way interaction effect in a graphical format. For 
participants with recent hospital experience (panel A), the individual outcome based policy 
is not only evaluated more positively in the psychologically close but also in the 
psychologically far situation (overruling effect of the internal, concrete and ego-centric, 
mindset). In contrast, for participants without recent hospital experience (panel B), the 
individual outcome based policy is evaluated more positively in the psychologically close 
situation, while the collective outcome based policy is evaluated more positively in the 
psychologically far situation, as is predicted by CLT. Hence, we find support for H3 and 
can only confirm H1a-b for participants without recent hospital experience. 
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Figure 4: Results Experiment 17 
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 A separate analysis with planned comparisons is provided in Appendices F and G. 
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Our findings suggest that individuals with recent hospital experience activate a more 
concrete, ego-centric mindset compared to individuals without recent hospital experience. 
The activation of such an internal mindset diminishes the effect psychological distance of 
the decision context has on how individuals evaluate an allocation policy. Consequently, 
we show that individuals’ personal interest can affect general CLT expectations and may 
constitute an important factor researchers should control for. Only after controlling for 
recent hospital experience, we were able to confirm CLT predictions in that a collective 
outcome based policy is more (less) positively evaluated in a psychologically far (close) 
decision context while an individual outcome based policy is more (less) positively 
evaluated in a psychologically close (far) decision context. 
3.5 Experiment 2 
Next to a collective vs. individual interest trade-off, allocation policy makers also need to 
trade off efficiency collective outcomes (the total number of life years saved) vs. equity 
collective outcomes (the distribution of life years saved). A collective outcome is efficient 
when it maximizes the total number of QALYs saved in the society, and is equal when the 
number of QALYs saved among patients has a similar distribution from patient to patient. 
Although both efficiency and equity foci concentrate on the collective interest and thus 
induce a more abstract mental construal, they may differ on their level of abstraction 
(equity being more abstract than efficiency; see theory leading up to H2a-b). The purpose of 
investigating allocation policy evaluations for efficiency vs. equity collective outcomes is 
to test whether the boundary (overruling) effect of recent hospital experience still holds for 
collective outcomes that have a different level of abstraction. 
 
3.5.1 Method 
Design 
Experiment two had a 2 (efficiency vs. equity based allocation policy) by 2 (close vs. far 
psychological distance) between-subjects factorial design to test whether people evaluate 
equity based policies more (less) favorably than efficiency based policies in a 
psychological distant (close) situation. To manipulate the focal outcome of the allocation 
policy, we again use the concept of QALYs (Quality of Adjusted Life Years). An 
efficiency based allocation policy is one in which the total number of QALYs saved in 
society is relatively high (while the distribution of QALYs saved in society is relatively 
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unequal). An equity based allocation policy is one in which the distribution of QALYs 
saved in society is relatively equal (while the total number of QALYs saved in society is 
relatively low). To manipulate the psychological distance in the decision context, we use 
the same manipulation as for Experiment 1. Specifically, the close psychological distance 
situation focused on an allocation policy implementation for a hospital in the neighborhood 
that is going to implement a new policy within one year, whereas the far psychological 
distance situation focused on a hospital in the country that will implement a new policy ten 
years from now8. 
Participants 
A total of 710 panel members of a Dutch research company, representative for the Dutch 
population in terms of gender and age, completed a short online questionnaire about the 
evaluation of a new allocation policy in the health care sector. Thirty-two respondents 
were classified as outlier because they completed the questionnaire in an unusual low or 
high amount of time, leading to a total of 678 participants used for data analyses. The 
average age of the participants was 46.75 years within a range of 18-82 years and 49.7% of 
the respondents were male. 
Procedure 
Similar as for Experiment 1, we introduced participants in the topic and clarified several 
health care terms to make sure that participants had the required knowledge to successfully 
participate in the questionnaire. Next, we randomly assigned respondents to one of the two 
psychologically distant decision situations (close/far) and told them that the current 
allocation system of hospitals [in their neighborhood/in the Netherlands] became out of 
date and that therefore a new policy [is going to be implemented within one year/will be 
implemented in ten years from now]. Next, they were shown and asked to evaluate one of 
the two health care allocation policies (either the efficiency based or the equity based one). 
Furthermore, we asked respondents how fair they perceived the specific policy to be. 
Fairness is an important construct that is frequently mentioned in the literature on 
efficiency vs. equity allocation policies (Andersson & Lyttkens, 1999; Evans, Vossler, & 
Flores 2009; Goncalo & Kim, 2010). We expect that fairness is especially important in this 
experiment where consumers’ personal attitude (e.g., political preference) can influence 
which of the two policy outcomes are considered as fair and is less important in 
Experiment 1 where collective outcomes are considered as more fair by the general 
                                                          
8
 See Appendix E for a scenario example. 
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population9. We therefore consider fairness as an important covariate that should be 
controlled for in the analyses. After the evaluation and fairness tasks, we asked participants 
to answer questions related to the construal level of the efficiency and equity collective 
outcomes. Finally, we asked participants to answer some additional questions               
(e.g., hospital experience, demographics, etc.), and thanked them. The survey took on 
average about 7.5 minutes to complete. 
Measures 
We used the same measures as the ones of Experiment 1 for the main dependent variable, 
attitude toward the allocation policy, as well as for the questions to test the construal level 
of the allocation policy outcomes. These measures were highly reliable (exploratory factor 
analysis for attitude toward the allocation policy: eigenvalue = 4.166, 83% of variance 
explained, loadings ranging from .90 to .93, Cronbach’s Į = .95; Cronbach’s Į = .94 and 
.96 for the efficiency vs. equity outcomes respectively). To measure perceived policy 
fairness, we adapted one statement of the (price) fairness scale of Darke and Dahl (2003), 
and asked respondents to assess the perceived fairness of the allocation policy on a seven-
point Likert scale. 
 
3.5.2 Results and discussion 
To check whether the construal levels of our efficiency vs. equity collective outcomes 
were perceived as expected, we tested whether participants perceived the distribution of 
QALYs saved in society as a higher-level construal than the total number of QALYs saved 
in society. The paired samples t-test revealed that indeed the equity collective outcomes 
were perceived as more abstract than the efficiency collective outcomes (μEQUITY = 4.45 vs. 
μEFFICIENCY = 4.32; t(677) = 2.38, p < .05). 
 We conducted an ANOVA with attitude toward the allocation policy as dependent 
variable, and policy type (efficiency vs. equity based policy), psychological distance (close 
vs. far psychological distance), hospital experience (recent – own or a family member’s 
hospitalization in the past five years – vs. no recent experience) and all their two- and 
three-way interactions as independent variables. We also control for the covariate fairness, 
which has, as expected, a highly significant positive effect (F(1, 669) = 363.67, p < .001). 
In contrast to Experiment 1, we find no significant effect of the three-way interaction 
between psychological distance, policy type and hospital experience (F(1, 669) = 2.43, p = 
                                                          
9
 Explicitly including fairness as covariate in Experiment 1 indeed confirmed that it did not change the 
substantive results. 
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.120), pointing out that for this experiment no overruling effect can be found for a 
consumer’s personal interest (no support for H3). The main effects of psychological 
distance and hospital experience, and the other two-way interactions, are not significant 
either. We do find a significant effect of policy type (F(1, 669) = 15.07, p < .001) and a 
significant interaction effect between policy type and psychological distance (F(1, 669) = 
5.85, p < .05). Figure 5 portrays this significant interaction effect in a graphical way. In 
line with H2a-b, we confirm that the equity based policy is evaluated more positively in the 
psychologically far situation, while the efficiency based policy is evaluated more 
positively in the psychologically close situation, as is predicted by CLT.  
  
Figure 5: Results Experiment 210 
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In contrast to Experiment 1, we do not find support for the overruling effect of hospital 
experience on expected congruency effects in this experiment. It seems that a consumer’s 
personal interest can only exert a significant effect when consumers are comparing 
individual with collective outcome based policies and not when they are comparing two 
collective outcome based policies. Concrete and ego-centric thoughts triggered by a recent 
hospital experience are thus not strong enough to overrule situationally induced mindsets 
triggered by the decision context when considering two collective outcome based policies. 
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 A separate analysis with planned comparisons is provided in Appendices F and G. 
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Irrespective of recent hospital experience, we find confirmation of CLT expectations in 
that consumers evaluate equity based policies relatively more (less) favorably than 
efficiency based policies in a psychological distant (close) situation. 
3.6 General Discussion 
Investigating if, and if so how, the psychological distance in a decision context has an 
influence on the focus placed on outcomes in allocation policy evaluations as well as 
investigating if, and if so to what extent, these effects are weakened by a consumer’s 
personal interest has important academic and managerial implications. In Experiment 1, 
we find that collective outcomes are perceived as more abstract than individual outcomes, 
and are evaluated more positively when the social distance of the focal outcome in an 
allocation policy is congruent with the psychological distance inherent in the decision 
context (a collective outcome based allocation policy and a far psychological distance, as 
well as an individual outcome based allocation policy and a close psychological distance, 
respectively). Yet, this confirmation of CLT expectations connected with the congruency 
or value of fit effect is only true for individuals that did not have recent hospital 
experience. For those that did have recent hospital experience, a concrete, ego-centric 
internal mindset is activated that diminishes the effect of the situationally induced mindset 
and leads to a more positive evaluation of the individual outcome based allocation policy 
in both a close and far psychological distance. In Experiment 2, we find that equity 
collective outcomes are perceived as more abstract than efficiency collective outcomes, 
and are evaluated more positively when the social distance of the focal outcome in an 
allocation policy is congruent with the psychological distance inherent in the decision 
context (an equity based allocation policy and a far psychological distance, as well as an 
efficiency based allocation policy and a close psychological distance, respectively). In this 
experiment, we do not find an overruling effect of consumers’ recent hospital experience. 
 
3.6.1 Academic contributions 
These findings add to the literature of allocation policy theory by showing that a 
consumer’s evaluation of an allocation policy may depend on the interaction of the 
outcomes presented and the temporal and/or spatial frame of the decision context. 
Psychological distance is thus an important element that needs to be considered by 
organizations in their decisions on when and how to communicate about the allocation 
policy decision announcement. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
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investigates the effect of psychological distance in the decision context on consumers’ 
evaluation of an allocation policy. 
We also add to prior CLT work by studying to what extent psychological distance can 
change consumers’ preferences for different allocation policy outcomes, and by proposing 
an interaction effect between the psychological distance inherent in the decision context 
and the social distance of the allocation policy’s outcomes. Our finding that allocation 
policy outcomes are perceived differently based on their abstractness with collective 
outcomes being perceived as more abstract than individual outcomes and equity collective 
outcomes being perceived as more abstract than efficiency collective outcomes contributes 
to the CLT literature because it is a new and useful insight that helps to explain many 
practical issues related to resource allocation in public domains such as health, recreation, 
and education. Also the finding of the positive effects of congruency between the 
psychological distance and the social distance of outcomes in the context of allocation 
policy implementations is an important contribution because it focuses on a relatively 
unexplored field of research that is of paramount importance for the entire society. Trope 
(2004), for instance, observed that, although the societal implications of CLT are 
substantial, CLT has not often been tested with socially meaningful stimuli.  
 Finally, we add to CLT literature by showing that a consumer’s personal interest 
may be an important factor that should not be neglected and that may interfere with     
well-established and general CLT expectations. Our research shows that consumers’ 
personal interest only diminishes the activation of the situationally induced mindset when 
consumers are considering an outcome that has direct consequences for one’s own 
personal life. So, concrete thoughts from hospital experience seem to become more 
accessible in a situation where one’s own individual outcomes are at stake than in a 
situation where individuals solely trade off collective outcomes. This is in line with a   
‘not-in-my-backyard’ mindset where individuals prefer the policy with the highest 
personal benefits and avoid those with collective outcomes. The finding that personal 
interest may activate a mindset that diminishes the effect of a situationally induced mindset 
is a very novel contribution to the CLT literature. We advice future CLT researchers to 
control for an individual’s internal mindset, next to taking into account situationally 
induced mindsets triggered by the psychological distance inherent in the decision context. 
 
3.6.2 Managerial implications 
Recognizing that individuals weigh collective vs. individual outcomes or efficiency vs. 
equity collective outcomes differently depending on the distance present in the decision 
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context can have large ramifications for society and social welfare. Our research shows 
that allocation policies that focus on collective outcomes, or on equity collective outcomes 
benefit most when they are introduced in a far psychological distance context, e.g., with a 
more distant temporal timing (e.g., announcing the policy quite some time before its 
launch), for a more remote location (e.g., announcing the policy for a provider that is 
located in a vicinity far away), using a more hypothetical situation (e.g., announcing the 
policy with an imaginary example) and/or for more socially distant others                     
(e.g., announcing the policy with an example that describes strangers). In contrast, 
allocation policies that focus on individual outcomes, or on efficiency collective outcomes 
benefit most when they are introduced in a close psychological distance context, e.g., with 
a close temporal timing (e.g., announcing the policy just before its launch), for a close 
location (e.g., announcing the policy for a provider that is located in the close vicinity), 
using a less hypothetical situation (e.g., announcing the policy with a real example) and/or 
for less socially distant others (e.g., announcing the policy with an example that describes 
friends). Depending on the launch time of the allocation policy and the service provider’s 
location, policy makers should (or should not) highlight the temporal or spatial distance 
inherently connected to the decision context. If the temporal or spatial frame is incongruent 
with the social distance of the focal outcome of the allocation policy, they could use any of 
the other suggested distance manipulations. 
 As was shown by Experiment 1, a boundary effect is found for those consumers 
that have recent experience and that consider collective vs. individual outcome based 
allocation policies. Here, policy makers should be aware of the strong (concrete and     
ego-centric) mindset that is triggered by consumers’ recent experiences and that may 
overrule situationally induced mindsets. Future research may investigate what tactics can 
be used to lessen the impact of such an internal mindset, when considering outcomes that 
may have an important own personal effect. 
 
3.6.3 Limitations and avenues for further research 
Some limitations of our study are worth noting and open up avenues for possible further 
research. First, our respondents were shown a hypothetical allocation policy situation, 
which did not have direct consequences for them. It would be interesting to investigate 
allocation policy evaluations for real allocation policy implementations. Second, 
respondents were asked to evaluate allocation policy implementations in a health care 
setting. Although we believe that our results are relevant for a wide range of contexts, it 
would be interesting to extend our research for other domains that are confronted with a 
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scarcity of service resources which is often the case in recreation, and education industries. 
Third, both collective and individual outcomes as well as equity and efficiency collective 
outcomes were described on a rather vague level in our hypothetical situation (e.g., a low 
or high number of life years saved). It might be interesting to investigate how consumers 
evaluate allocation policies when more precise specifications are used (e.g., two or twelve 
life years saved). 
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Chapter 4. Collective Costs and Benefit Evaluations 
of Customized Care11 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite growing recognition in medical decision making of the importance of               
non-health-related aspects of care (e.g., waiting times, contact modes, etc.), they are 
generally not taken into account in mainstream economic evaluations informing health 
care management decisions. In particular, for non-health-related aspects of care there is no 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) based guidance to decide what is best for each 
patient. Therefore patient preferences rather than QALYs become of more central concern 
when comparing treatments or interventions in which health related aspects of care play a 
minor role. From the patient perspective full customization of care according to patient 
preferences would be optimal in such cases. Yet, there is little guidance about how the 
costs and benefits of non-health-related aspects of customized care can be measured and 
used in medical decision making. In this study we propose and test a discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) based approach to evaluate these costs and benefits. The approach is 
illustrated for post-treatment breast cancer care. We demonstrate that, for this case, 
offering (fully) customized care is cost-effective compared to current practice in which 
typically only one type of follow-up is recommended for all patients. 
4.1 Introduction 
In medical decision making, the decision whether to implement a certain health care 
program is usually supported by an economic evaluation in which the costs and the health 
benefits of the program are compared to those of other possible programs (Sendi, Gafni, & 
Birch, 2002). The benefits are generally presented in incremental life years or Quality 
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) gained as a result from implementing each program. The 
QALY measure is the preferred outcome measure for economic evaluations (Dolan, Shaw, 
Tsuchiya, & Williams, 2005; Earnshaw & Lewis, 2008; Mason & Drummond, 1995) and 
takes into account the societal preferences for different health outcomes. However, the 
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 Based on Benning, Kimman, Dirksen, Boersma and Dellaert (2010). 
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measure ignores individual-specific preferences of patients for different care programs 
(Smith, Drummond, & Brixner, 2009). This is especially restrictive when there are only 
minor differences in health outcomes of health care programs, because in those cases 
QALY differences cannot clearly guide health policy or health care allocation decisions. 
Besides cost-differences between health care programs patient preferences for               
non-health-related aspects of care (e.g., health care provider and contact mode) can also be 
decisive in these cases (Ryan, Major, & Skatun, 2005).  
 Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are increasingly used as a tool to measure 
patient preferences for non-health-related aspects of care (Ryan & Hughes, 1997; Ryan, 
1999; Sculpher et al., 2004). The question how to use the information from such DCEs to 
support hospitals (and policy makers) in their decision of implementing health care 
programs, however, is largely unanswered in the health care literature. Therefore, we 
demonstrate how costs and DCE-based preference information for non-health-related 
aspects of care can be used to support medical decision making. In particular, we exploit 
the fact that DCEs can take into account heterogeneity in patient preferences. Especially in 
view of the rising importance of individualized (i.e., customized) care the introduction of 
such an approach is both relevant and topical (Cribb & Owens, 2010). 
 We illustrate our approach by means of a case of follow-up after breast cancer 
treatment. Patients were found to have heterogeneous preferences for this type of care with 
no known differences in health benefits between care programs (Kimman et al., 2010). We 
base our analysis on the non-health-related aspects of follow-up and the costs associated 
with several follow-up strategies recently reported in the MaCare trial performed in the 
Netherlands (Kimman et al., 2007). The MaCare trial was a multicenter trial in which 320 
breast cancer patients were randomized into one of four follow-up strategies. We use DCE 
estimates (Kimman, 2010) to demonstrate how individual-specific DCE estimates can be 
incorporated in economic evaluations. This allows us to investigate if offering patients the 
option to choose among a flexible set of breast cancer treatment follow-up programs (i.e., 
customized care) can be cost-effective compared to standard care and to specific other 
follow-up programs that offer no individual flexibility. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief 
overview of customized care and the use of discrete choice experiments in health care. 
This is followed by the random utility model we use and a description of how to combine 
individual-specific DCE estimates and costs to inform health care decision making. Next, 
we describe the application that we study in terms of the DCE experiment estimates and 
their corresponding cost structure. This allows us to illustrate our approach for the case of 
follow-up after breast cancer treatment. Finally, we present analyses of the cost-utility 
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structure of different follow-up programs as well as a (fully) customized care program. We 
close with a discussion of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
4.2 Individual-Level DCE Estimates and Cost Evaluations 
4.2.1  Customized care 
Different individuals have their own specific preferences and this heterogeneity in taste is 
also prominent in health care. For example, there is significant variation in preferences 
between individuals with regard to treatment programs (Owens & Nease, 1997; Sculper & 
Gafni, 2001). The rise of consumerism and the available information through the Internet 
have raised patients’ expectations about care and increasingly patients demand care that is 
in line with their preferences (Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007). These factors, together with the 
increasing importance of non-health-related aspects of care (Ryan & Shackley, 1995; 
Ryan, 2004), have led to a growing recognition that preference heterogeneity should be 
taken into account in health care policy evaluations by using a more individualized 
approach of cost-effectiveness analysis (Basu & Meltzer, 2007). Traditionally, the focus of 
cost-effectiveness analysis has lain on identifying average costs and benefits in the 
population. Basu & Meltzer (2007), however, indicated that it is valuable to identify    
cost-effectiveness on the individual level, because most health care interventions are    
cost-effective only for a subset of people in society. Introducing more individualized 
(customized) health care programs that better serve the preferences of individuals by 
allowing them to select the attribute levels to match their preferred treatment procedure 
(i.e., contact mode, frequency of visits, etc.) might be a solution. For the purpose of this 
chapter we confine our analysis of customized care to health care programs that offer 
patients the possibility to choose between several attribute levels for non-health-related 
aspects of care. The proposed principles can, however, be extended relatively easily to also 
include patient preference for program aspects that have clear health consequences      
(e.g., treatment method). 
 
4.2.2 Using DCEs to discover individual health care preferences  
A discrete choice experiment (DCE) is a method based on stated preferences in which 
respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical alternatives that are constructed on 
the basis of an experimental design. A large number of DCE applications can be found in 
the health economics literature, ranging from preferences with regard to miscarriage 
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management (Ryan & Hughes, 1997), liver transplantations (Ratcliffe & Buxton, 1999), in 
vitro fertilization (Ryan, 1999), and prostate cancer (Sculpher et al., 2004). Thus, DCEs 
have become a standard tool for health economics research (Viney, Lancsar, & Louviere, 
2002). DCEs are used to elicit patient preferences, and to quantify trade-offs between 
alternative treatments (e.g., Ratcliffe & Buxton, 1999; Ryan, 1999; McIntosh & Ryan, 
2002; Lancsar & Savage, 2004). Although there is growing recognition that DCEs have the 
potential to contribute more directly to outcome measurement for use in economic 
evaluations (Lancsar & Louviere, 2008), the question how DCE data can be used to inform 
health policy (Bryan & Dolan, 2004) is still relatively unexplored. McIntosh (2006) 
proposed an initial framework for cost benefit analysis using DCEs. McCormack et al. 
(2005) review different types of benefit measures that can be analyzed to support health 
policy decisions including DCE derived welfare estimates as one of the options. However, 
an empirical analysis that combines (individual-specific) DCE estimates and costs is still 
missing in the health care literature. Yet, policy decision makers could use combined cost 
and (individual-specific) DCE information as a valuable tool in deciding which health 
policy to implement and whether to allow for a customized format of the policy or not. 
Therefore, in the next section we describe an approach that can be used to inform health 
care decision making by making use of an individual-level preference model combined 
with cost data. 
 
4.2.3 The individual-level preference model 
When individual-specific preferences for non-health-related aspects of care are ignored 
this can lead to biased welfare measures and erroneous policy evaluations (Persson, 2002; 
Flynn, 2010). Therefore it is important for health policy makers to take these individual 
preferences into account. A way to explicitly measure individual preferences is by using 
DCEs in combination with an analysis of respondents’ preferences using a random 
parameter logit (RPL) model (Hensher, Rose, & Green, 2005). Though it is also possible to 
use a multinomial logit (MNL) model and to create interaction terms (e.g., with          
socio-demographic characteristics) to represent preference heterogeneity, this latter method 
requires systematic effects of individual characteristics on preferences and is a relatively 
crude way to capture heterogeneity compared to the estimation of a RPL model (Colombo, 
Hanley, & Louviere, 2008). As described above, individual preferences can be easily 
incorporated in the assessment of several health care programs by estimating an RPL 
model based on DCE data. Below we outline the characteristics of such an individual-level 
preference model. 
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The model is based on random utility theory which assumes that an individual n’s utility 
for choice alternative j in observation t )( njtU , consists of a systematic utility component 
)( njV  and a random component )( njtε . 
 
njtnjnjt VU ε+=  (1) 
The probability that alternative j is chosen, given that a respondent has to choose between 
alternatives j and i, is specified as: 
 
)Pr()Pr()Pr( njtnitninjnitninjtnjnitnjtnjt VVVVUUP εεεε −>−=+>+=>=  (2) 
 
If we assume that the error terms (i.e., İnjt, İnit) are identically and independently Gumbel 
distributed this results in the standard binary logit specification for a given individual n: 
 
))exp()/(exp()exp( ninjnjnj VVVP +=  (3) 
To further specify the individual-level differences in preferences, the model is extended by 
explicitly allowing for individual-specific variations in taste: 
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(4) 
Here the utility component is described in terms of the vector of observed attributes for the 
health care program (xj) and an individual-specific vector of preference coefficients (ȕn). 
The preference vector is separated in a mean preference component shared by all 
individuals (ȕ) and an individual-specific error component that captures differences in 
individuals’ taste (Ȟn). The individual-specific error components are assumed to be 
independently normally distributed and are allowed to have different variances. In this way 
the RPL model takes into account variations in respondents’ taste (i.e., preference 
heterogeneity). 
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4.2.4 Combining individual-specific DCE estimates and costs 
One of the advantages of the RPL model is that it is possible to obtain posterior estimates 
for each individual’s preference parameters for the attributes of a health care program 
based on the individual’s observed choices and the distribution estimates (Hole, 2008; 
Train, 2003). This is different from, for example, the standard conditional logit model that 
estimates average population parameters for the attributes of a health care program. By 
using the individual-specific parameters from a RPL model a more precise total utility 
measure can be calculated for each specific health care program by adding all     
individual-specific utility estimates for the individuals in the sample for the attributes of 
this specific health care program. Offering patients health care programs that better suit 
their preferences leads to a higher total gain in utility. This utility can be combined with 
health care cost data for the specific program j provided to individual n ( njC ) to allow for 
comparisons across programs (see section 4.3.3). A cost-utility comparison with other 
health care programs can also be made to analyze whether offering a customized program 
leads to greater utility and/or lower costs for the total sample. If a sufficiently large number 
of patients choose a less costly program in the customization process, this leads to both 
higher total utility and lower costs. The reason is that patients tend to choose less 
expensive programs from which they derive a higher utility in such cases. 
 
4.3 The Case of Customized Breast Cancer Follow-Up 
In this section we provide an empirical application of how DCE estimates can be combined 
with cost data to inform health care decision makers. The application is based on 
preference data for follow-up after breast cancer treatment. We start with the description of 
the discrete choice experiment. Then, cost calculations with regard to the DCE scenarios 
are provided. This is followed by an illustration of how these costs are combined with 
estimates of DCEs to help health care decision makers choose between implementing 
different (customized versus non-customized) health care programs.  
 
4.3.1 The discrete choice experiment (DCE) 
Experimental design, survey, and data 
Since details of the DCE are described elsewhere (Kimman et al., 2010), we provide only a 
brief overview. Attributes and attribute levels (Table 5) were based on a review of the 
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literature (Kimman et al., 2007), new local policy initiatives (Kimman et al., 2007), and 
expert opinions (Coast & Horrocks, 2007). An orthogonal fractional factorial design with 
32 hypothetical choice tasks was created from the full factorial (256 scenarios). Two 
surveys, each presenting 16 choice tasks to a patient, were used. All respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of the two surveys. The survey started with a short introduction 
of the purpose and effectiveness of follow-up after breast cancer treatment followed by a 
description of the attributes and their levels and the choice tasks. The data collection took 
place between May and July 2008. In total 331 patients (from five hospitals) completed the 
DCE (response rate of 59%). Their average age was 58 years (ranging from 34 to 83 years) 
and the mean time since finalizing breast cancer treatment was 14 months (ranging from 2 
to 24 months).  
 
Table 5:  Attributes and attribute levels 
Attributes Levels Explanations 
Attendance at 
educational group 
program (EGP) 
Yes 
No 
The educational group program consists of two group meetings 
of two hours, led by a breast care nurse and health care 
psychologist, in which patients (and their partners) are informed of 
the physical and psychosocial consequences of the disease and 
its treatment, and possible signs of recurrence. 
Frequency of visits Every 3 months 
Every 6 months 
Every 9 months 
Every 12 months 
The frequency of visits determines whether a patient has 
scheduled follow-up visits every 3, 4, 6, or 12 months. Regardless 
of the frequency, patients can always make additional 
appointments whenever they feel the need. 
Waiting time in 
minutes 
5 
30 
60 
90 
This is the time a patient has to wait after the set time of the 
appointment. This can thus be at the hospital or general 
practitioner’s office (face-to-face contact) or at home (telephone 
contact). 
Contact mode Face to face 
Telephone 
A visit (face-to-face) to a health care provider consists of a short 
physical examination and open discussion about general wellbeing 
and the recovery process. A telephone follow-up consists of an 
open discussion about general wellbeing and the recovery process 
only. If the patient or health care provider feels the need, an 
additional appointment (face-to-face) can be made. 
Healthcare 
provider 
Medical specialist 
Breast care nurse/ 
nurse practitioner 
General practitioner 
Breast care nurse 
and 
medical specialist 
The medical specialist is (preferably) the patient’s surgeon, 
oncologist or radiotherapist. They may alternate. The breast care 
nurse is a nurse specialized in breast cancer; a nurse practitioner 
is a nurse with advanced medical training (master’s level). They 
are both referred to as breast care nurse in the survey. In all cases 
the last contact with the health care provider is with a medical 
specialist to conduct a mammography. 
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Model 
We analyzed the DCE data by estimating the proposed RPL model in NLOGIT 3.0 
(Econometric Software Inc.). The utility function of our model is specified as follows: 
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where: 
njtU  is individual n’s utility associated with a specific follow-up scenario j in choice 
observation t, 
81 ββ −  are the mean parameter estimates of the model that indicate the preference for 
each attribute as it occurs in follow-up scenario j.  
nn 81 νν − correspond to the individual-specific error terms for every preference parameter. 
EGP is a dummy variable for educational group program attendance or not. 
FREQ and 2FREQ represent the frequency and squared frequency respectively of 
follow-up visits in a year. 
WT  represents waiting time during follow-up interaction with the hospital. 
TEL  is a dummy variable for telephone vs. face-to-face contact,  
BCN  (breast care nurse), GP (general practioner), and BCNMS /  (i.e., alternating 
between medical specialist and breast care nurse) are dummy variables reflecting the 
different health care providers of follow-up, with medical specialist only visits as a base 
level. The base levels reflect current practice levels in the Netherlands, 
 and njtε   is an error term which captures any remaining unobserved error. 
4.3.2 Results 
Model estimates 
The model estimation results show significant mean preference parameters for all but two 
of the attributes and with signs as expected. Patients prefer personal contact, no EGP, 
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shorter waiting times, more frequent visits, and being helped by a medical specialist and 
breast care nurse )/( BCNMS . We also find that there is significant preference 
heterogeneity for the attributes of follow-up programs after breast cancer treatment     
(Table 6). This is evidenced by the significant estimates for the standard deviations for the 
individual-specific error terms )( nν  for all but two of the preference parameters 
( 2FREQ and BCNMS / ). The estimates show that the size of the preference 
heterogeneity component is relatively large. This results in the fact that several different 
programs have the highest preference for different patients, which is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Therefore it is especially relevant to investigate whether offering customized care is     
cost-effective compared to standard practice and other follow-up strategies. 
 
Table 6:  Random parameter model estimations 
 Random 
 parameters )( nβ  
Heterogeneity 
component )( nν    
 
Variable 
 
β  
 
St.Er. 
 
Sign. 
 
ν  
 
St.Er. 
 
Sign. 
 
TEL  -2.15 .12 .00 
 
1.62 
 
.12 .00 
EGP   
 
-.14 
 
.08 .08 1.20 
 
.10 .00 
WT  
 
-.01 .00 .00 
 
.01 
 
.00 .00 
FREQ  
 
1.56 .19 .00 
 
.45 
 
.05 .00 
2FREQ  -.22 .04 .00 
 
.01 .02 .47 
 
BCN  -.47 .10 .00 
 
1.08 
 
.12 .00 
GP  -2.24 .16 .00 
 
1.83 
 
.15 .00 
BCNMS /  .13 
 
.09 .16 .31 
 
.20 .12 
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Figure 6: Patients’ highest utility programs with full customization 
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EGP, 3x nurse led face to face follow -up and 1x specialist-led face to face follow -up
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Costs 
The costs of alternative follow-up strategies were calculated with hospital management 
decision makers in mind. Thus, we use a narrow health care perspective, and only include 
those costs related to the attributes used in the DCE that are relevant in cases where 
managers wish to evaluate whether or not to offer customized care for breast cancer 
follow-up programs in their own hospital. Costs for follow-up related resource use were 
primarily obtained from the Dutch governmental manual for health care cost analysis 
(Oostenbrink, Bouwmans, Koopmanschap, & Rutten, 2004). Costs for hospital visits were 
based on cost prices for academic hospitals. All cost prices were converted to 2008 Euros 
by means of price index numbers (CBS statline).  
 The cost price for a telephone follow-up by a nurse was calculated by multiplying 
the hourly wage of a specialized nurse with the average length of a telephone follow-up as 
reported in the MaCare trial (20 minutes). The hourly wage was calculated by using the 
gross monthly salary of a highly qualified nurse and a nurse’s average yearly working 
hours (Oostenbrink et al., 2004). Furthermore, 39% for employer’s contributions and 45% 
overhead costs were added which is in line with common practice. The cost calculation for 
a hospital follow-up visit with the breast care nurse is almost identical to telephone  
follow-up for this type of health care provider, the only difference is that 41 Euros were 
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added for material and direct personnel costs (Oostenbrink et al., 2004). Face to face and 
telephone follow-up performed by a medical specialist were calculated in a similar way. 
The hourly wage of a medical specialist was based on the average annual salary divided by 
the hours of patient time (Oostenbrink et al., 2004). We added 35% employer’s 
contributions (due to the higher salaries for a medical specialist a maximum contribution is 
reached) and again 45% overhead (Oostenbrink et al., 2004). Based on data from a clinical 
trial we assumed that the follow-up contact was 5 minutes shorter when performed by a 
medical specialist instead of a nurse (15 instead of 20 minutes) (Beaver et al., 2009). 
 Given these calculations, the cost prices of nurse led telephone follow-up, nurse 
led face to face follow-up, specialist led telephone follow-up, and specialist led face to face 
follow-up are respectively €20.51, €64.92, €37.54, and €81.94. 
 Following guidelines for breast cancer follow-up, patients have an annual 
mammography. The medical specialist usually discusses the results of the mammography 
with the patient during a hospital visit. For these reasons we assume the last follow-up of 
the sequence to be specialist-led and face to face follow-up. The costs for the 
mammography (€79.75) are based on the wage of a radiologist and the cost price of a 
mammography. Costs for the EGP included the hourly wages of a health care psychologist 
and breast care nurse, the costs of using facilities as well as costs of an information 
booklet. The MaCare-trial showed that the average cost per patient for the EGP was €119 
(based on 7 patients and 3 to 4 partners per session). 
 Using the cost prices we were able to calculate the costs for all possible follow-up 
strategies. For example, the total costs to the hospital for a follow-up strategy in which a 
patient has four face to face visits per year with the medical specialist as the health care 
provider, and participation in the EGP is calculated as follows: 4 x 81.94 (four times 
specialist based face to face follow-up) + 119 (EGP) + 79.75 (mammography) = €526.51.  
 
4.3.3 Policy evaluation 
Utility calculations 
The individual-specific preference parameter estimates from the RPL model can be used to 
calculate the utility for a specific follow-up program for each individual, but also for the 
calculation of the total utility for the sample of a given follow-up program. This can be 
done by simply adding all the individual-specific utilities of a follow-up program for all 
individuals in the sample (an illustration of these calculations for ten patients of our sample 
can be found in Appendix H). Note that it is also possible to calculate the total utility for 
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all patients in the sample when patients are offered the option to choose between several 
follow-up programs (i.e., customized care). Calculating the total utility for such a 
customized follow-up program can be done by first determining what the most preferred 
program is for each patient, and subsequently adding the utilities of all patients for these 
programs. Finally, for a cost-effectiveness analysis for the sample the total costs of such a 
customized approach can be calculated by adding the per patient costs of all preferred 
programs. The utility and cost averages of a (customized) follow-up program can be 
obtained by dividing the total utility and total costs by the number of patients in the 
sample. In the next section we conduct such an analysis and investigate the question 
whether offering customized programs can be cost-effective in the case of breast cancer 
follow-up care. 
Follow-up program evaluations 
To inform health care decision makers about the cost-effectiveness of customized care, the 
average utility estimate of each follow-up strategy and its average costs have to be 
compared to the average utilities and costs of other strategies or current practice to decide 
which strategy to implement. In Figure 7 we show the evaluation results for several 
follow-up programs relative to the current standard program (“S”)12: These programs 
represent two “best in class” alternative programs and programs that were evaluated in the 
MaCare trial. They are: 1. A single alternative program that leads to much lower average 
costs than the standard program and an approximately equal average utility level (“A”), 2. 
The least expensive single alternative program (“C”), 3. A strategy in which patients 
receive their preferred follow-up program from the four programs that were evaluated in 
the MaCare trial (“4M”), 4. A strategy in which patients receive their preferred follow-up 
program from the four programs of the MaCare trial and a reduced version of these 
programs with the option to get one follow-up visit less (“4M-”), and 5. A fully 
customized program in which all patients receive their preferred (highest utility) follow-up 
program (“FC”). Table 7 provides a summary description of the programs and indicates if 
a program’s cost and utility values are strictly dominated by other programs or not. Note 
that in the cost-utility analysis for which multiple programs are available we assume that 
patients are assigned by hospital management to the patient’s own specific highest utility 
program.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Waiting time is assumed to be constant across programs and was set at 5 minutes in the evaluations. 
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Table 7:  Cost-utility comparisons of follow-up programs 
Follow-up 
program label 
Follow-up 
program description 
Average 
utility 
difference* 
Average 
cost 
difference* 
Dominated 
 
Cheapest Single 
Alternative (“C”) 
 
2 x nurse-led telephone follow-up and 1 
specialist-led face to face visit, no EGP 
 
-2.69 
 
-€204.80 
 
Non-
dominated 
 
Single 
Alternative (“A”) 
 
3 specialist-led face to face visits, no EGP 
 
-0.01 
 
-€81.94 
 
Non-
dominated 
 
Standard (“S”) 
 
4 specialist-led face to face visits, no EGP 
 
0 
 
€0 
 
Dominated 
by FC 
 
Choice from 
MaCare 
programs 
(“4M”) 
 
A choice of the MaCare programs: 
4 specialist-led face to face visits, no EGP 
3 x nurse-led telephone follow-up and 1 
specialist-led face to face visit, no EGP 
4 specialist-led face to face visits, EGP 
3 x nurse-led telephone follow-up and 1 
specialist-led face to face visit, EGP 
 
0.25 
 
€44.53 
 
Dominated 
by FC & 
4M- 
 
Choice from 
MaCare 
programs and 
MaCare 
programs with 
one visit less 
(“4M-”) 
 
A choice of the MaCare programs 
+ the option to have one visit less 
 
0.37 
 
€1.77 
 
Dominated 
by FC 
 
Fully 
Customized 
(“FC”) 
 
 
Customized program for all patients based 
on individual patient preferences - includes 
all program attributes 
 
0.61 
 
-€32.07 
 
Non-
dominated 
* The current standard program is taken as a basis for comparison 
 
The results demonstrate that full customization of care according to patients’ preferences 
would be a very good option. The average utility of such a strategy is higher than that of 
all alternative programs, while its average costs are below the current standard, and also 
lower than programs 4M and 4M-. Thus, the fully customized program (FC) dominates 
programs S, 4M, and 4M- (Table 7). The single alternatives A and C are not dominated by 
FC because they have lower average costs, and in some instances hospital managers may 
be willing to trade off higher utility against lower costs. 
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Since full customization may not be practical in all settings, it is also interesting to 
investigate alternative follow-up programs that offer less choice. In these alternative 
strategies patients can choose between several programs that are offered by the hospital. 
For instance, in program “4M-” patients have a choice between programs with a frequency 
of three or four visits, nurse-led telephone follow-up or specialist-led face to face     
follow-up, and an EGP or not. Assigning patients to these eight follow-up programs leads 
to a higher average utility level and higher average costs than the “standard” follow-up 
program (Figure 7). In summary, our analysis indicates that, in the case of follow-up after 
breast cancer treatment, customized programs can be cost-effective alternatives to a      
one-strategy-for-all approach, especially when current cost levels are acceptable to hospital 
management. 
 
Figure 7: Cost-utility comparisons of FU programs with current standard practice 
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4.4 Discussion 
In this study we propose and test a DCE-based approach to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of (non-health-related aspects of) care. We offer a stepwise illustration of the approach in 
the context of breast cancer follow-up programs. The results of the use of our approach in 
the post-treatment breast cancer care case indicate that offering customized follow-up 
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programs to patients can benefit both patients and hospitals in cases where patients have 
heterogeneous preferences.  
 The strength of a DCE lies in the fact that it is grounded in economic theory and 
because patients are forced to make trade-offs, DCEs provide more reliable estimates of 
utilities than traditional satisfaction-based questionnaires. Furthermore, a DCE provides 
relevant information on the strength of preferences of patients for (non-health aspects of) 
care and can therefore assist hospitals and policy makers in determining what aspects of 
care will guide the patient’s preferences. Moreover, DCEs allow for the evaluation of 
currently non-available alternatives when hospitals wish to change their policies. 
 While this approach is new to the health care literature and potentially relevant in 
many areas of medical decision making there are some issues that could be addressed in 
future research. First, the cost calculations in this chapter are based on a health care 
management perspective, only including costs of the proposed follow-up strategy to the 
hospital itself. For the purpose of illustrating the DCE-based approach we felt this was 
appropriate. However, for policy makers there will often be other (health care costs) 
related to the health care program that they may wish to incorporate (e.g., visits to other 
health care professionals, diagnostic tests, productivity losses). Hence, the cost calculations 
used in this chapter provided a hospital management oriented approach, but in other health 
care cases these costs may be extended to also cover total costs to society. 
 Second, in clinical practice, it may be challenging to offer customized care since it 
may lead to loss of economies of scale or it may require substantial implementation costs. 
In the case of breast cancer follow-up, there needs to be sufficient capacity and skills levels 
need to be such that the staff is able to provide both telephone follow-up and the EGP for 
example. Customized care also requires careful documentation of the proposed strategy 
and good communication among patient, doctors, nurses and other care providers involved. 
Hospitals should take this aspect into account when they consider offering customized 
health care programs.  
 Third, decisions on what type of care to offer to patients have to be made before a 
health program is implemented in clinical practice. In this study DCE estimates were 
measured in a sample of women who had been treated for breast cancer and who were 
between six months and two years in follow-up. An advantage of using these respondents 
was that they provided informed preferences for most attributes. Preference measurements 
for relatively unknown characteristics of a follow-up would have to rely on patient 
information provided in the survey and may be more uncertain (Salkeld, Ryan, & Short, 
2000). However, a disadvantage of using an experienced sample, such as in the current 
study, may be that the preference for the follow-up program with which respondents have 
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experience may be stronger than for other programs, for example, due to endowment 
effects or status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Salkeld, Ryan, & Short, 2000). 
Hence, when conducting a DCE it is extremely important to carefully design the survey 
instrument and select an appropriate sample, possibly including a wide range of patients, 
with and without experience with the proposed health care program.  
 Fourth, the utility levels in a choice model are dependent on the selected reference 
points in the model (e.g., the standard follow-up program) as well as on the overall scale of 
the error term in the model (Flynn, 2010). Therefore, comparison of cost-utility trade-offs 
between different studies is problematic. This is aggravated in cases such as ours in which 
no prices are charged to patients and therefore WTP-measures cannot be calculated to 
resolve part of the scaling problem. Furthermore, while for QALY-based cost evaluations 
clear guidelines are established that describe the value of a QALY in Euros or Dollars to 
make program comparisons possible, for utility-based evaluations such guidelines do not 
exist. The managerial implication of this model structure is that for utility-based cost 
evaluation models hospitals and policy makers need to make case by case decisions on 
whether or not a certain utility improvement (or cost reduction) is cost-effective. This is 
straightforward in case a program dominates another program (e.g., full customization    
vs. the current standard program), but becomes more difficult for non-dominated program 
comparisons (e.g., the least expensive alternative program vs. the current standard 
program). 
  In summary, we have provided the reader with a step by step illustration of the 
use of DCEs to evaluate health care program costs and benefits that provides insight in 
how to compare (and combine) health care programs for which patients have 
heterogeneous preferences. While the emphasis of our approach lies on preference 
measurement for non-health-related aspects of care, this approach could also be applied to 
investigate the relationship between patient preferences for differences in QALYs between 
health care programs. Many DCEs also incorporate health outcomes (e.g., life years gained 
by the program or improved quality of life) and patients may wish to trade-off some health 
benefits for a better process of care. We plan to study this integration in future research. 
However, given the strong dominance of health outcomes in medical decision making we 
believe that the present approach may be particularly useful when health care decision 
makers are presented with different options to offer care to the patient, that are not 
expected to directly influence health outcomes, but that are likely to affect patient 
satisfaction and have financial implications. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
5.1 Conclusion 
In chapter two we showed that collective health outcomes play an important role in the 
consumer allocation policy evaluation process. One of the main findings of this chapter is 
that distributional collective health outcome evaluations (compared to total collective 
health outcome evaluations) have a relatively lower impact on consumers’ attitude towards 
an allocation policy for health care treatments that have life improving consequences than 
for treatments with life saving consequences. We find support for the explanation that 
these differences are caused by the difference in emphasis that consumers place on total 
versus distributional collective outcomes depending on whether their decisions are made 
for luxury or necessity goods. In line with earlier research we find that individuals prefer 
the distribution of treatments with life improving consequences (relative luxuries) to be left 
to the market, while they prefer the distribution of treatments with life saving 
consequences (relatively scarce necessities) to be regulated (Berry, 1994; Kemp, 1996; 
Kemp, 1998; Mahoney, Kemp, & Webley, 2005). Indeed we find that compared to a 
treatment with life saving consequences, a treatment with life improving consequences is 
considered as more a luxury than a necessity type of good.  
 The second important finding of chapter two is that price-based priority access 
allocation policies for which treatment takes place within the regular working hours of the 
hospital have a negative effect on total and distributional collective health outcome 
evaluations, but that in case of treatment outside of the regular working hours of the 
hospital these effects turn out to be positive for total collective health outcome evaluations 
and negative for distributional collective health outcome evaluations. Interestingly, 
consumers appear to recognize the fact that treatment of patients outside regular working 
hours of the hospital offers additional supply and therefore increases the total collective 
health outcomes. For distributional collective health outcome evaluations, however, the 
effect of price-based priority access allocation policies is also negative when patients are 
treated outside of regular working hours. This is likely to be the case because even when 
offered outside of regular working hours, price-based priority access allocation policies 
still lead to inequalities.  
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In chapter three (Experiment 1) we found that collective outcomes are perceived as more 
abstract than individual outcomes, and are evaluated more positively when the social 
distance of the focal outcome in an allocation policy is congruent with the psychological 
distance inherent in the decision context (a collective outcome based policy and a far 
psychological distance, and an individual outcome based policy and a close psychological 
distance, respectively). This confirmation of CLT expectations connected with the 
congruency or value of fit effect is found only for individuals that did not have recent 
hospital experience. However, for those individuals with recent hospital experience, a 
concrete, ego-centric internal mindset is activated that diminishes the effect of the 
situationally induced mindset and leads to a more positive evaluation of the individual 
outcome based allocation policy in both a close and far psychological distance. In 
Experiment 2, we found that equity collective outcomes are perceived as more abstract 
than efficiency collective outcomes, and evaluated more positively when the social 
distance of the focal outcome in an allocation policy is congruent with the psychological 
distance inherent in the decision context (an equity based allocation policy and a far 
psychological distance, as well as an efficiency based allocation policy and a close 
psychological distance, respectively). We have not found an overruling effect of 
consumers’ recent hospital experience in this experiment because here the focus is on 
collective outcomes only and the trade-off with individual outcomes does not play a role. 
 In chapter four we demonstrated how the collective costs and benefits of 
customized health care programs can be evaluated and used to support management and 
policy decisions for customized care. Follow-up after breast cancer was studied as a very 
relevant example. We showed that, in the case of follow-up care after breast cancer, 
offering patients fully customized programs is cost-effective and also preferred by patients. 
Theoretically, this chapter demonstrates how non-health-related aspects of care             
(i.e., patient preferences for contact modes, waiting times, etc.) can be incorporated into 
economic evaluations informing health care management decisions. 
5.2 Managerial Implications 
The research presented in this dissertation provides various relevant insights for managers. 
In chapter two we found that health care treatments with life improving consequences 
decrease the impact of distributional collective health outcome evaluations (compared to 
total collective health outcome evaluations) on consumer attitude towards the allocation 
policy relative to treatments with life saving consequences. This finding suggests that 
people put relatively less weight on distributional aspects when lives are not at stake. It can 
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be used as input in allocation policy decision situations for different kind of health care 
treatments. For instance, policy makers could decide to implement an allocation policy that 
is likely to lead to a less equal distribution (and a relatively higher total number) of quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs) saved, but only in case the allocation policy is meant for a 
treatment with life improving consequences.  
 We also found that the negative impact of price-based allocation policies on total 
collective health outcome evaluations can be overcome by offering more flexible hours of 
operation (i.e., treatment outside the regular working hours). In practice, hospitals could 
use this finding by offering patients the option to pay for priority access only in case 
treatment takes place outside the regular working hours of the hospital. In this way 
hospitals might also be able to generate extra revenues that could eventually be used to 
increase supply by building new hospital units, for example. 
 In chapter three we showed that allocation policies that focus on collective 
outcomes, or on equity collective outcomes, benefit most when they are introduced in a far 
psychological distance context, e.g., with a more distant temporal timing (e.g., announcing 
the policy quite some time before its launch), and for a more remote location                
(e.g., announcing the policy for a provider that is located in a vicinity far away). In 
contrast, allocation policies that focus on individual outcomes, or on efficiency collective 
outcomes, benefit most when they are introduced in a close psychological distance context, 
e.g., with a close temporal timing (e.g., announcing the policy just before its launch), and 
for a close location (e.g., announcing the policy for a provider that is located in the close 
vicinity). Depending on the launch time of the allocation policy and the service provider’s 
location, policy makers should (or should not) highlight the temporal or spatial distance 
inherently connected to the decision context. As was shown by Experiment 1, a boundary 
effect is found for those consumers that have recent experience and that consider collective 
vs. individual outcome based allocation policies. Here, policy makers should be aware of 
the existence of a strong (concrete and ego-centric) mindset that is triggered by consumers’ 
recent experiences and that may overrule situationally induced mindsets.  
 In chapter four we demonstrated how individual-specific discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) estimates and cost data can be used to inform medical decision making 
using follow-up after breast cancer as an example. In practice, hospitals can use the 
presented approach to decide on the question which health care program to implement 
given all (possible) programs.  
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5.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
One of the questions that are answered in this dissertation is how consumers evaluate 
price-based priority access allocation policies (with a special focus on the role of 
individual and collective outcomes). The reason why we investigate consumer evaluations 
of such policies is that consumer evaluations are a critical consideration for policy makers 
and other decision makers when they face the decision to implement a certain policy. Low 
consumer evaluations can be used as indication of low public support and can lead policy 
makers to decide not to implement the policy because of public dissatisfaction. The 
existence of detailed information about consumer evaluations of health care policies could 
also be used by governments in their choice of implementing a specific policy.  
A good way to capture consumer opinions is to measure how consumers evaluate 
a policy by means of their attitude towards the policy (as has been done in chapters two 
and three). One could argue that other metrics like consumer willingness-to-pay or 
consumer choice are also appropriate, but this is only the case if they could be more useful 
for hospitals and policy makers in practice, for example in future scenarios in which 
patients could actually choose between hospital policies. The main reason for using 
attitude measurements in this dissertation is because of our goal to better understand the 
consumer evaluation of flexible health care policies that, in contrast to the regular policies, 
might harm ethical norms. We are highly interested in how consumer’s think about 
policies that deviate drastically from the standard policies offered. Currently, asking 
respondents about their attitudes towards a policy (i.e., how bad-good, unpleasant-pleasant, 
harmful-beneficial, and unfavorable-favorable they perceive a policy to be) gives better 
insights into the “acceptability” of a policy than asking them to choose between policies. 
One should keep in mind that this dissertation is a first step in evaluating new flexible 
health care allocation policies. For future research it might be interesting to let respondents 
choose between new allocation policies and ask them, for example, how much they would 
like to pay for the policy when it will be implemented in real life. This would offer hospital 
managers practically useful information.  
Besides the use of other metrics to measure consumer evaluations there are other 
limitations and avenues for future research that should be mentioned. First, in chapter two 
we used liver transplantation treatment and ear correction treatment manipulations to 
distinguish between treatments with life saving and life improving consequences 
respectively. It would be interesting to investigate if our results also hold across a wider 
range of health applications by testing whether distributional collective health outcome 
evaluations (compared to total collective health outcome evaluations) still have a relatively 
lower impact on consumers’ attitude towards an allocation policy when other types of 
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treatments with life improving (and life saving) health consequences are used in the 
treatment type manipulations.  
Second, in the same chapter, we also used different types of price-based 
allocation policies, but we did not investigate a price-based allocation policy in which the 
price to get priority access to health care treatment is much higher. Using such a high price 
could lead to substantial additional income for the hospital that could be used to benefit all 
patients by building new hospital units that increase supply, for example. It might be 
interesting to test how consumers evaluate this type of price-based allocation.  
Third, in Figure 4 (chapter three) we show that, in a close psychological distance, 
the individual outcome based policy is more positively evaluated than the collective 
outcome based policy for respondents with recent hospital experience (panel A), as well as 
for respondents without recent hospital experience (panel B). The significance of these 
findings is confirmed by the planned comparisons for Experiment 1 in Appendix F (i.e., (F 
(1, 602) = 3.396; p < .10), and (F (1, 68) = 3.327; p < .10) respectively). These findings are 
in line with our CLT expectation that individual outcome based policies are more 
positively evaluated than collective outcome based policies in a psychologically close 
decision context. 
We also see in Figure 4 that, in a far psychological distance, the individual 
outcome based policy is more positively evaluated than the collective outcome based 
policy for respondents with recent hospital experience (panel A). This is confirmed by the 
planned comparison (F (1, 602) = 3.083; p < .10) in Appendix F. We explained this finding 
by the activation of a concrete, ego-centric mindset that overrules the situationally induced 
mindset due to recent hospital experience. In Figure 4 we also show that, in a far 
psychological distance, the collective outcome based policy is more positively evaluated 
than the individual outcome based policy in case respondents do not have recent hospital 
experience (panel B). This is in line with our CLT expectations. However, the planned 
comparisons in Appendix F indicate that the mean evaluation of an individual outcome 
based policy does not differ significantly from the mean evaluation of a collective outcome 
based policy in a psychologically far decision context for respondents without recent 
hospital experience (F (1, 68) = 1.640; p = .205).  
We also did another planned comparison for Experiment 1 (Appendix G) to 
actually confirm the interaction-effect of hospital experience. This planned comparison 
indicates that, in a psychologically far situation, the individual outcome based policy is 
significantly higher evaluated than the collective outcome based policy in case respondents 
have recent hospital experience (F (1, 340) = 3.164; p < .10), as was found before. 
Furthermore, this planned comparison shows that, in a psychologically far situation, the 
Chapter 5 
 
76
individual outcome based policy is significantly higher evaluated by respondents with 
recent hospital experience than by respondents without recent hospital experience (F (1, 
340) = 5.311; p < .05). This indicates that the interaction-effect based on hospital 
experience mainly comes from a significant difference in evaluation of the individual 
outcome based policy for respondents with hospital experience versus respondents without 
hospital experience (in a psychologically far decision context).  
A reason that could explain why the difference in evaluation of the collective 
outcome based policy versus the individual outcome based policy, in a far psychological 
decision context, for respondents without recent hospital experience, is not significant (F 
(1, 340) = 1.561; p =.212) (Appendix G), is probably the small number of respondents in 
the group that does not have recent hospital experience (N = 606 for recent hospital 
experience, and N = 72 for no recent hospital experience in Experiment 1). This imbalance 
in group size can be seen as a clear disadvantage of the analysis in chapter three. Maybe 
future researchers can take this into account and base their research on a balanced sample 
that consists of an equal number of experienced and non-experienced respondents.  
In chapter three we showed that hospital experience can be a boundary condition 
for CLT to hold. Another interesting question to address in future research is whether other 
boundary conditions like familiarity with the object of evaluation and other types of 
experiences also affect general CLT expectations (due to the activation of a more concrete, 
ego-centric mindset that overrules general CLT expectations). 
Fourth, in chapter four we described an approach that can help hospitals to decide 
on the question which (customized) health care program to implement. However, when 
using this approach, a comparison of cost-utility-trade offs between different studies is 
problematic because of the fact that the utility levels in a choice model are dependent on 
the selected reference points (here the standard follow-up program). The managerial 
implication is that for utility-based cost evaluation models case by case decisions should 
be made to decide on the question whether a certain utility improvement is cost-effective. 
This can be regarded as a disadvantage of the proposed approach.  
Fifth, although we made use of a patient sample in chapter four, chapters two and 
three are based on general population samples. It would be relevant to know if the use of 
patient data for the analysis in chapters two and three would lead to the same or different 
results, for example, because patients may be less focused towards health outcomes for 
others. On the other hand, a disadvantage of using patient data (i.e., an experienced 
sample) in chapter four is the possible higher preference for the follow-up program 
respondents have experience with due to endowment effects or status quo bias (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988; Salkeld, Ryan & Short, 2000). 
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Sixth, in both chapters two and three respondents were shown hypothetical 
allocation policy situations which did not have real-life consequences for them. It would be 
interesting to investigate allocation policy evaluations for allocation policies that are on the 
agenda to be implemented, because respondents’ evaluations might be different in case of 
real-life consequences. Future research could address this question by means of a real-life 
experiment. This would be especially interesting in the context of CLT.  
Finally, it might also be interesting to investigate whether our results can be 
replicated in other domains that are confronted with scarcity of service resources like 
recreation and education.  
The findings of this dissertation are both theoretically as well as practically 
relevant and can be helpful for future real-life policy implementation decisions in health 
care. It is very well possible that we see more flexible health care policies in the future. 
Our analysis shows that both priority access pricing when treatment takes place outside the 
regular working hours of the hospital (Table 4 - Model 3) and customized care (Table 7) 
seem particularly attractive to the general public. We hope that the insights generated in 
this dissertation trigger future research that further investigates these and related questions 
in the important domain at the crossroads of health care and marketing. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Construct descriptions and measurements (Study 1) 
Constructs  Item Descriptions Factor  
Loadings 
Construct 
Reliability 
Allocation 
mechanism 
attitude* 
 
How would you describe your feelings toward the policy of hospital 
X? 
1. Very bad - Very good 
2. Very unpleasant - Very pleasant 
3. Very harmful - Very beneficial 
4. Very unfavorable - Very favorable 
 
 
.94 
.93 
.90 
.93 
 
 
.96 
Total 
health 
outcome 
1. The policy of hospital X probably leads to a relatively high total 
number of quality adjusted life years gained. 
2. The expected total number of quality adjusted life years gained 
that the policy of hospital X probably leads to is acceptable. 
3. The total number of quality adjusted life years gained that 
probably results from the policy of hospital X does not satisfy me.** 
.75 
 
.94 
.83 
Distributional 
health 
outcome 
 
1. The policy of hospital X probably results in an unreasonable 
distribution of quality adjusted life years among patients. 
2. The distribution of quality adjusted life years among patients that 
probably results from the policy of hospital X does not satisfy me. 
3. The policy of hospital X probably leads to a fair distribution of 
quality adjusted life years among patients.** 
.76 
 
.95 
.83 
Own chance 
of treatment 
 
1. Given the policy of hospital X there is a relatively high probability 
that I will be treated this year. 
2. Given the policy of hospital X the chance that I will be treated this 
year satisfies me. 
3. The chance that I will be treated in this year based on the policy of 
hospital X does not please me.** 
.88 
 
.96 
.91 
Own payment 
 
1. The payment I have to make for a treatment given the policy of 
hospital X is probably too high. 
2. The price I probably have to pay for a treatment given the policy 
of hospital X is unacceptable. 
3. I am pleased with the payment I have to make to get a treatment 
based on the policy of hospital X.** 
.87 
 
.91 
.88 
* Except allocation mechanism attitude, which is a 7 point semantic-differential scale, all scales are 7 point likert 
scales with endpoints totally disagree - totally agree. 
** Deleted to improve measurement performance 
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Appendix B. Testing for common method variance (Study 1) 
 
Model Model 3 + Control 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Allocation mechanism attitude 
 Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Constant )(α  3.50** .43** 
Price-based allocation  mechanism )( iPRICEβ  -.15** 
 
.02 
Lottery )( iLOTβ  .41** .24** 
Waiting list )( iWLβ  .71** .19** 
Selection  )( iSELβ  .45** .29* 
Total  health outcome  )( iTOTALβ  .27** .08** 
Distributional health outcome )( IONALiDISTRIBUTβ  .24** .16** 
Own chance of treatment  )( iOWNCHANCEβ  .35** .13** 
Own payment )( TiOWNPAYMENβ  .11** .20** 
Life improving health consequence  )( VINGiLIFEIMPROβ  -.01 .07* 
Total health outcome x Life improving health consequence 
)( EIMPROVINGiTOTALxLIFβ  
.15**  
Distributional health outcome x Life improving health 
consequence 
)( IMPROVINGIONALxLIFEiDISTRIBUTβ  
-.10**  
Control )( iCONTROLβ  -.01 .08** 
           * p < .05 ** p < .01. 
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Appendix C. Construct descriptions and measurements (Study 2) 
 
Constructs  Item Descriptions* Factor  
Loadings 
Construct 
 Reliability 
Allocation 
mechanism  
attitude** 
 
How would you evaluate the policy of hospital X? 
1. Very bad -Very good 
2. Very unpleasant - Very pleasant 
3. Very harmful - Very beneficial 
4. Very unfavorable - very favorable 
 
.91 
.92 
.93 
.93 
 
.96 
Total 
health  
outcome 
1. The expected total number of life years saved satisfies me. 
2. The expected total number of life years saved is high. 
3. The expected total number of life years saved is acceptable. 
.91 
.92 
.94 
.95 
Distributional  
health  
outcome 
 
1. The expected distribution of life years saved among patients 
satisfies me. 
2. The expected distribution of life years saved among patients 
is good. 
3. The expected distribution of life years saved among patients 
is acceptable . 
.95 
 
.96 
 
.96 
.97 
Own chance 
of treatment 
 
1. My chance of being treated fast satisfies me. 
2. My chance of receiving treatment fast is high. 
3. My chance of receiving treatment fast is acceptable. 
.90 
.86 
.92 
.92 
Own payment  
 
1. The price I have to pay for treatment satisfies me. 
2. The price I have to pay for treatment is good. 
3. The price I have to pay for treatment is acceptable. 
.96 
.98 
.96 
.98 
Fairness 
 
1. The policy is fair. 
2. The policy is justifiable. 
3 The policy is just. 
 
.91 
.92 
.91 
.94 
* Translated from Dutch 
** Except allocation mechanism attitude, which is a 7 point semantic-differential scale, all scales are 7 point 
likert scales with endpoints totally disagree - totally agree. 
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Appendix D. Testing for common method variance (Study 2) 
 
Model Model 3 + Control 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Allocation mechanism attitude 
 Mean 
)(β  
St. dev. 
)(ν  
Constant  )(α  3.40** .12** 
Price-based within )( INiPRICE −β  -.34** .03 
Price-based outside )( OUTiPRICE −β  .49** .03 
Fairness  )( iFAIRNESSβ  .47** .12** 
Total health outcome )( iTOTALβ  .05* .05** 
Distributional health outcome )( IONALiDISTRIBUTβ  .12** .04** 
Own chance of treatment )( iOWNCHANCEβ  
 
.19** .12** 
Own payment )( TiOWNPAYMENβ  .06** .07** 
Life improving health consequence  
)( VINGiLIFEIMPROβ  
.06* .08** 
Total health outcome x Life improving health consequence 
)( EIMPROVINGiTOTALxLIFβ  
.06  
Distributional health outcome x Life improving health 
consequence 
)( IMPROVINGIONALxLIFEiDISTRIBUTβ  
-.10**  
Control )( iCONTROLβ  -.02 .10** 
              * p < .05 ** p < .01. 
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 Appendix E. Scenario descriptions* 
 
Scenario for Experiment 1 
The current patient allocation system of hospitals [in the neighborhood/in the country] 
became out of date. Therefore, a new policy [is going to be implemented within one year/ 
will be implemented in ten years from now]. The expected outcomes of this policy, 
compared to the current situation, are described below. As you can see the policy outcome 
consists of two parts. 
 
Part 1: The total number of QALYs saved in society is relatively [high/low] 
Part 2: The total number of QALYs saved for one’s own is relatively [low/high] 
 
Scenario for Experiment 2 
The current patient allocation system of hospitals [in the neighborhood/in the country] 
became out of date. Therefore, a new policy [is going to be implemented within one year/ 
will be implemented in ten years from now]. The expected outcomes of this policy, 
compared to the current situation, are described below. As you can see the policy outcome 
consists of two parts. 
 
Part 1: The total number of QALYs saved in society is relatively [high/low] 
Part 2: The distribution of QALYs saved in society is relatively [unequal/equal] 
 
* Translated from Dutch 
Appendix 
 
84
Appendix F. Planned comparisons Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Experiment 1 
Planned comparisons based on Figure 4 A: Recent hospital experience. 
 
IOBP13 close14 vs. COBP15 close  (F (1, 602) = 3.396; p < .10) 
IOBP far16 vs. COBP far   (F (1, 602) = 3.083; p < .10) 
IOBP close vs. IOBP far   (F (1, 602) = 0.080; p = .777) 
COBP close vs. COBP far  (F (1, 602) = 0.041; p = .839)  
 
Planned comparisons based on Figure 4 B: No recent hospital experience. 
 
IOBP close vs. COBP close  (F (1, 68) = 3.327; p < .10) 
IOBP far vs. COBP far   (F (1, 68) = 1.640; p = .205) 
IOBP close vs. IOBP far   (F (1, 68) = 2.618; p = .110) 
COBP close vs. COBP far  (F (1, 68) = 2.362; p = .129) 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Planned comparisons based on Figure 5. 
 
EFBP17 close vs. EQBP18 close  (F (1, 669) = 21.462; p < .001) 
EFBP far vs. EQBP far   (F (1, 669) = 3.252; p < .10) 
EFBP close vs. EFBP far   (F (1, 669) = 0.902; p = .343) 
EQBP close vs. EQBP far  (F (1, 669) = 3.558; p <.10) 
 
 
                                                          
13
 IOBP = Individual outcome based policy 
14
 Close = Close psychological distance 
15
 COBP = Collective outcome based policy 
16
 Far = Far psychological distance 
17
 EFBP = Efficiency based policy 
18
 EQBP = Equity based policy 
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Appendix G. Additional planned comparison Experiment 1 
 
Planned comparison for Experiment 1 (based on a far psychological distance). 
2,75
3
3,25
3,5
3,75
4
Yes No
Recent hospital experience
A
tt
itu
de
 
to
w
ar
d 
th
e 
po
lic
y
Individual outcome based policy
Collective outcome based policy
 
 
IOBP experience19 vs. COBP experience   (F (1, 340) = 3.164; p < .10) 
IOBP no experience vs. COBP no experience  (F (1, 340) = 1.561; p = .212) 
IOBP experience vs. IOBP no experience   (F (1, 340) = 5.311; p < .05) 
COBP experience vs. COBP no experience   (F (1, 340) = 0.073; p = .787) 
 
                                                          
19
 Experience = Recent hospital experience 
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Appendix H. Utility calculations* 
 
 
* For specialist-led face to face follow-up (4 times a year) and no EGP based on individual level DCE estimates. 
** Total utility of respondent 1: ((-0.239 x 0) + (-0.012 x 5) + (-1.398 x 0) + (1.275 x 4) + (-0.217 x 16)) = 1.568. 
 *** For practical reasons calculations for only 10 respondents are illustrated in this table. 
 **** The total utility is calculated by summing the utilities of all individuals (i.e., 1.568 + 3.305 +  … + …  =  25.357).  
 ***** Medical specialist is used as reference category in our calculations, therefore the health care provider is not shown. 
 
Resp. 
 
EGP 
 
Code 
 
 
WT 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Tel 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Freq 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Freq²  
 
 
Code 
 
 
Utility***** 
 
 
1 
 
-0.239 
 
0 
 
-0.012 
 
5 
 
-1.398 
 
0 
 
1.275 
 
4 
 
-0.217 
 
16 
 
1.568** 
 
2 
 
-0.708 
 
0 
 
-0.015 
 
5 
 
-0.945 
 
0 
 
1.725 
 
4 
 
-0.220 
 
16 
 
3.305 
 
3 
 
-2.419 
 
0 
 
-0.002 
 
5 
 
-0.621 
 
0 
 
1.334 
 
4 
 
-0.222 
 
16 
 
1.774 
 
4 
 
-1.176 
 
0 
 
-0.012 
 
5 
 
0.335 
 
0 
 
1.557 
 
4 
 
-0.237 
 
16 
 
2.376 
 
5 
 
-0.152 
 
0 
 
-0.007 
 
5 
 
-4.463 
 
0 
 
 1.492 
 
4 
 
-0.222 
 
16 
 
2.381 
 
6 
 
-2.393 
 
0 
 
-0.004 
 
5 
 
-1.351 
 
0 
 
1.537 
 
4 
 
-0.225 
 
16 
 
2.528 
 
7 
 
-1.091 
 
0 
 
-0.003 
 
5 
 
-0.122 
 
0 
 
1.331 
 
4 
 
-0.228 
 
16 
 
1.661 
 
8 
 
-1.402 
 
0 
 
-0.009 
 
5 
 
-2.731 
 
0 
 
1.948 
 
4 
 
-0.220 
 
16 
 
4.227 
 
9 
 
-1.850 
 
0 
 
-0.007 
 
5 
 
-2.772 
 
0 
 
1.763 
 
4 
 
-0.220 
 
16 
 
3.497 
 
10*** 
 
 -1.138 
 
0 
 
-0.000 
 
5 
 
-3.077 
 
0 
 
1.394 
 
4 
 
-0.221 
 
16 
 
2.04 
            
25.357**** 
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Summary (English) 
The rise of consumerism and the increasing availability of information through the Internet 
have increased patients’ demand for care that is more in line with their preferences. 
Because of this trend the expectation that hospitals act according to each individual 
patient’s preferences is becoming even more prominent. Hospitals could respond by 
implementing flexible health care policies that offer patients more choice.  
 In this dissertation we explore two types of flexible health care policies from the 
consumer perspective: priority access pricing and customized care. We do this by (1) 
investigating how consumers evaluate price-based priority access allocation policies (i.e., 
allocation policies in which patients are offered the option to pay extra for faster health 
care access), and by (2) demonstrating how the collective costs and benefits of customized 
health care policies (i.e., policies that offer individuals the possibility to “create” their own 
health care program) can be used to evaluate customized care. Throughout, special 
attention is given to the role of collective health outcomes. 
Besides our scientific conclusions, our findings are also relevant for hospitals and 
policy makers that consider implementing new allocation policies. They can be used to 
provide assistance in future health care decision making.  
Summary (English) 
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Samenvatting (Nederlands) 
De stijgende drang om te consumeren en de steeds groter wordende hoeveelheid informatie 
die beschikbaar is via Internet heeft de vraag naar zorg die voldoet aan de voorkeuren van 
de patiënt sterk vergroot. Hierdoor is de verwachting dat ziekenhuizen zich gedragen naar 
gelang de voorkeuren van iedere patiënt steeds duidelijker aanwezig. Ziekenhuizen kunnen 
hierop reageren door het invoeren van flexibele beleidsvormen in de gezondheidszorg die 
patiënten meer keuze bieden. 
 In dit proefschrift verdiepen we ons in twee verschillende soorten van flexibel 
beleid in de gezondheidszorg vanuit het perspectief van de consument: betaalde snellere 
toegang en maatwerk in de zorg. Dit doen we door te onderzoeken hoe de consument een 
allocatiebeleid van betaalde snellere toegang tot zorg (d.w.z. een allocatiebeleid waarin 
patiënten de optie wordt geboden extra te betalen om snellere toegang tot gezondheidszorg 
te krijgen) evalueert, en door te demonstreren hoe de collectieve kosten en opbrengsten 
van een beleid dat maatwerk gezondheidszorg aanbiedt (d.w.z. het aanbieden van 
zorgprogramma’s die individuen de mogelijkheid bieden om hun eigen zorgvariant samen 
te stellen), gebruikt kunnen worden om maatwerk in de zorg te evalueren. In dit 
proefschrift wordt daarbij speciale aandacht gegeven aan de rol van collectieve 
gezondheidsuitkomsten in de evaluatie door consumenten. 
Naast onze wetenschappelijke inzichten, zijn onze bevindingen ook relevant voor 
ziekenhuizen en beleidsmakers die overwegen een nieuw allocatiebeleid in te voeren. Ze 
kunnen worden gebruikt om ondersteuning te bieden bij toekomstige 
besluitvormingsprocessen in de gezondheidszorg. 
Samenvatting (Nederlands) 
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PRIORITY ACCESS PRICING AND CUSTOMIZED CARE
The rise of consumerism and the increasing availability of information through the
Internet have increased patients’ demand for care that is more in line with their
preferences. Because of this trend the expectation that hospitals act according to each
individual patient’s preferences is becoming even more prominent. Hospitals could
respond by implementing flexible health care policies that offer patients more choice. 
In this dissertation we explore two types of flexible health care policies from the
consumer perspective: priority access pricing and customized care. We do this by (1)
investigating how consumers evaluate price-based priority access allocation policies (i.e.,
allocation policies in which patients are offered the option to pay extra for faster health
care access), and by (2) demonstrating how the collective costs and benefits of customized
health care policies (i.e., policies that offer individuals the possibility to “create” their own
health care program) can be used to evaluate customized care. Throughout, special
attention is given to the role of collective health outcomes.
Besides our scientific conclusions, our findings are also relevant for hospitals and policy
makers that consider implementing new allocation policies. They can be used to provide
assistance in future health care decision making.
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